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A PANTOMIME OF PRIVACY: TERRORISM 
AND INVESTIGATIVE POWERS IN 
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
RUSSELL A. MILLER* 
Abstract: Germany is widely regarded as a global model for the privacy protec-
tion its constitutional regime offers against intrusive intelligence-gathering and 
law enforcement surveillance. There is some basis for Germany’s privacy “ex-
ceptionalism,” especially as the text of the German Constitution (“Basic Law”) 
provides explicit textual protections that America’s Eighteenth Century Consti-
tution lacks. The German Federal Constitutional Court has added to those doc-
trines with an expansive interpretation of the more general rights to dignity 
(Basic Law Article 1) and the free development of one’s personality (Basic Law 
Article 2). This jurisprudence includes constitutional liberty guarantees such as 
the absolute protection of a “core area of privacy,” a “right to informational self-
determination,” and a right to the “security and integrity of information-
technology systems.” On closer examination, however, Germany’s burnished 
privacy reputation may not be so well deserved. The Constitutional Court’s as-
sessment of challenged intelligence-gathering or investigative powers through 
the framework of the proportionality principle means, more often than not, that 
the intrusive measures survive constitutional scrutiny so long as they are 
adapted to accommodate an array of detailed, finely tuned safeguards that are 
meant to minimize and mitigate infringements on privacy. Armed with a close 
analysis of its recent, seminal decision in the BKA-Act Case, in this Article I ar-
gue that this adds up to a mere pantomime of privacy—a privacy of precise data 
retention and deletion timelines, for example—but not the robust “right to be let 
alone” that contemporary privacy advocates demand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
2016 was a big year for Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office, 
Bundeskriminalamt (“BKA”). The agency made a big splash at the box of-
fice, as they featured prominently as Keystone Cops in the popcorn block-
buster, Captain America: Civil War.1 A black-helmeted, balaclava-clad BKA 
unit made a messy but ultimately successful chase of the film’s titular super-
hero across Austria and Romania. But the BKA was not able to prevent the 
inevitable, explosive battle royal at the Leipzig/Halle Airport.2 There were no 
signs of BKA agents as two super-powered teams tore each other (and the 
airport) apart. Still, the conspicuous absence of civilians at the scene suggests 
that the German authorities, surely with the help of the BKA, managed to 
evacuate the airport before all hell broke loose.3 
The BKA fared even better in a major decision issued by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht (“Constitutional 
Court”) on April 20, 2016, referred to in this Article as the BKA-Act Case.4 
Even if they remain less flashy than Marvel’s superheroes, Germany’s post-
9/11 law enforcement and intelligence services are mutated, muscled-up ver-
sions of the services that existed in the relatively quiet and seemingly aimless 
post-Cold War years. These new powers include, in various constellations 
secured across a dizzying number of statutes, the authority to investigate at an 
earlier point in time, using more intrusive measures, in order to prosecute or 
prevent a broader range of crimes and threats.5 The BKA was the last agency 
to benefit from enhanced powers, in part because of the difficult federalism 
issues implicated by the German states’ long-standing, nearly exclusive pre-
                                                                                                                           
 1 CAPTAIN AMERICA: CIVIL WAR (Marvel Studios 2016). 
 2 Id.; Doreen Beilke, Für Captain America! Hier fliegt unser Airport in die Luft, BILD (Nov. 
27, 2015), http://www.bild.de/regional/leipzig/captain-america/hier-fliegt-unser-airport-in-die-
luft-43565250.bild.html [https://perma.cc/9M9U-GZHQ]. 
 3 See CAPTAIN AMERICA, supra note 1. The BKA is drawn into the film’s “plot” by a bloody 
terrorist bombing at the U.N. Headquarters in Vienna. Id. Against the backdrop of the recent terror 
attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Berlin (not to mention the whole post-9/11 era), the bloated but 
hugely lucrative super hero genre currently hawked by Hollywood can be read as an escapist 
commentary on the helplessness movie audiences feel in the face of the continuing and very real 
threat of fundamentalist-inspired terrorism. See, e.g., TOM POLLARD, HOLLYWOOD 9/11: SUPER-
HEROES, SUPERVILLAINS, AND SUPER DISASTERS 97 (2011) (suggesting that superheroes, as the 
embodiment of Cold War-era scientific and technological advancements, reflects the U.S. popu-
lace’s general anxieties regarding combatting “terrorist attacks; . . . dictatorial, corrupt govern-
ments; . . . global climate change[; and] . . . economic depression”). 
 4 See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 
2016, 141 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 220, 2017 (BKA-
Act case). 
 5 See DORLE HELLMUTH, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE STATE: WESTERN RESPONSES TO 
9/11, at 78–127 (2015) (presenting an insightful account of the politics behind these reforms). 
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rogative over criminal law enforcement in the Federal Republic.6 It took a 
major overhaul of the German Constitution’s (“Basic Law”) federalism 
framework in 2006 to resolve the barriers to the creation of a more robust and 
centralized federal law enforcement role in the fight against international ter-
rorism.7 The amending law—entitled the “Act for the Federal Criminal Police 
Office’s Role in the Defense Against the Threat of International Terrorism” 
(Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terroismus durch das 
Bundeskriminalamt—“BKA-Act”)—entered into force in late 2008.8 That 
law did not empower the BKA to disregard the jurisdictional limits that the 
German agents casually flout in Captain America in their pursuit across both 
Austria and Romania, but the new powers granted to the BKA were nonethe-
less expansive and controversial at the time the law was enacted. Critics wor-
ried about the creation of a powerful, centralized law enforcement authority 
that was destined (if not designed) to run roughshod over civil liberties.9 Un-
surprisingly, the law became the focus of constitutional complaints before the 
Constitutional Court.10 
In the BKA-Act Case the Constitutional Court’s First Senate resolved 
the constitutional challenges to the amended BKA-Act in a long, complex, 
and contested judgment that left most of the BKA’s intrusive new investiga-
tive powers in place. Still, the Constitutional Court identified a number of 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See id. at 102. 
 7 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 73(1)[9a], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR4T-VWMT]; Gesetz zur Änderung 
des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending Basic Law], Aug. 28, 2006, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I 
at 2034; see also Arthur Gunlicks, German Federalism Reform: Part One, 8 GERMAN L.J. 111, 
113 (2007) (quoting the former prime minister of Bavaria who called federalism reform “the 
Mother of all Reforms”). 
 8 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
nalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense 
Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 
3083. This law amended and was integrated into the pre-existing BKA-Act. See Bundeskriminal-
amtgesetz [BKAG] [Federal Criminal Police Office Act], July 7, 1997, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 
[BGBL] I at 1650, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 26, 2016, BGBL I at 1818, art. 7, https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bkag_1997/BKAG.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9ZV-GFLW]. 
 9 E.g., Neues BKA-Gesetz: Opposition spricht von “schwarzem Tag für die Grundrechte,” 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 19, 2008, 6:16 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/neues-bka-
gesetz-opposition-spricht-von-schwarzem-tag-fuer-die-grundrechte-a-597652.html [https://perma.cc/
7TKP-8BWS] (describing passage of the new BKA-Act as a “dark day”) [hereinafter Opposition 
spricht]; BKA-Gesetz: FDP befürchtet “eine Art deutsches FBI,” FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
(Nov. 13, 2008, 12:37 PM), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bka-gesetz-fdp-befuerchtet-
eine-art-deutsches-fbi-1728463.html [https://perma.cc/SUB8-ANHR] (explaining the Free Demo-
cratic Party’s reservations about creating the German equivalent of the U.S. FBI). 
 10 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 141 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 220 (241–49), 2017 (analyz-
ing the constitutionality of multiple provisions of the 2008 BKA Act). 
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discrete, finely calibrated constitutional shortcomings in the amended law 
and ordered the German Parliament (Bundestag) to make the necessary, 
specifically articulated changes before June 30, 2018.11 It is an important 
decision that, for several reasons, merits careful scrutiny. Above all, in as-
sessing the new law’s many provisions, the Constitutional Court engaged 
with, consolidated, and expanded upon its extensive jurisprudence on ques-
tions of privacy and security—an area in which the Constitutional Court has 
been extremely active in the last decade.12 The BKA-Act Case invites a 
broad review of privacy law doctrine in Germany and it represents that 
field’s latest advance.13 Particularly with the NSA-Affair in mind (although 
neither the NSA nor Edward Snowden are mentioned in the decision),14 the 
BKA-Act Case is also significant because, for the first time, the Constitu-
tional Court considered the constitutional limits on international transfers of 
investigative and intelligence information.15 
Its status as a milestone of German privacy and security jurisprudence 
justifies a thorough assessment of the BKA-Act Case. But that is not the on-
                                                                                                                           
 11 Id. at (351). 
 12 Jörg Diehl & Dietmar Hipp, Urteil zum BKA-Gesetz: Polizisten murren über Verfas-
sungsgericht, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:07 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutsch
land/bundesverfassungsgericht-karlsruhe-bremst-bka-gesetz-a-1088298.html [https://perma.cc/MQ3Y-
2NW6]. Pointing to judgments in the 2004 Acoustical Surveillance Case, the 2008 Online Search 
Case, and the 2010 Data-Retention Case, the German news magazine Der Spiegel described the 
BKA-Act Case as the “tentative end-point” of the Constitutional Court’s post-9/11 jurisprudence, 
in which the court “reviewed numerous counter-terrorism and security laws, which it found to be 
partially or wholly unconstitutional.” Id. (Russell A. Miller trans.); see also Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 2010, 125 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 260, 2010 (Data-Retention Case); Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008, 120 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 274, 2009 (Online Search Case); Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 2004, 109 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 279, 2004 (Acoustical Surveillance Case).  
 13 Diehl & Hipp, supra note 12; see 141 BVERFGE 220 (351) (asserting the Constitutional 
Court’s broad authority to analyze the constitutionality of entire legislative acts). 
 14 The “NSA-Affair” refers to the world-wide controversy triggered by the massive trove of 
top-secret U.S. (and other countries’) intelligence information leaked in 2013 by former National 
Security Agency (“NSA”) contractor, Edward Snowden. Snowden’s former employer, the NSA, 
was particularly implicated by the leaks, which exposed a number of highly-invasive, voracious 
surveillance and data-collection programs. See generally GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO 
HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014) (documenting 
the NSA-Affair through his personal interactions with Edward Snowden); PRIVACY AND POWER: 
A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE NSA-AFFAIR (Russell A. Miller ed., 
2017) (providing multi-faceted analysis of privacy rights and investigative powers in light of the 
NSA-Affair through a compilation of essays). 
 15 See 141 BVERFGE 220 (341–51) (discussing section 14 of the BKA Act, and holding that 
international data transfers were permissible so long as the BKA takes measures to ensure the 
foreign entity’s use of the information comports with German privacy standards). 
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ly reason to give it our attention. The case also invites critical reflection on 
broader issues raised by Germany’s privacy and security jurisprudence. 
One of these issues is the Constitutional Court’s detailed, painstaking 
approach to the BKA-Act Case and other judgments in this area of the law. 
In this mode, the Constitutional Court draws finely calibrated, and very 
specific legislative terms out of the Basic Law’s non-textual and amorphous 
commitment to constitutional proportionality. The concern this interpretive 
approach raises was central to the arguments advanced by the dissenting 
justices in the BKA-Act Case. They objected that the Constitutional Court is 
too deeply involved in the delicate policy matters implicated by security 
issues.16 The Constitutional Court’s approach strips parliament of its author-
ity over an existential policy question that clearly demands, to the fullest 
extent possible, the advantages of democratic processes, including exper-
tise, responsiveness, and accountability. This is a form of the “judicial activ-
ism” critique that is familiar to American constitutional law scholars and 
commentators and it draws on what some critics see as the Constitutional 
Court’s seemingly limitless role—at the expense of more democratically-
accountable institutions—in shaping German law and policy.17 
A second, and more fundamental issue, is the question: to what kind of 
privacy does the Constitutional Court aspire? It is a confounding question 
prompted by a sharp incongruity. On the one hand, the BKA-Act Case was 
widely praised as a clarion manifesto for privacy in our digital age.18 This is 
a common perception of Germany’s “exceptional” privacy and security law 
framework. But, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court deemed most 
of the BKA’s intrusive new surveillance powers to be constitutional. The jus-
tices merely insisted on a number of minute, finely-detailed corrections 
straining for just a bit more clarity in the BKA-Act and just a little more pro-
cedural restraint from the BKA.19 The list of these constitutional flaws can 
almost seem banal. They certainly do not live up to the hopes of today’s best-
known privacy advocates. Instead it is a privacy jurisprudence writ small, 
where precise deletion deadlines and careful documentation of surveillance 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Id. at (353–78). 
 17 See generally Matthias Jestaedt, Phänomen Bundesverfassungsgericht. Was das Gericht zu 
dem macht, was es ist, in DAS ENTGRENZTE GERICHT: EINE KRITISCHE BILANZ NACH SECHZIG 
JAHREN BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 77–158 (2011) (discussing the German Constitutional 
Court’s central role in shaping German politics, and questioning the limits, or lack thereof, of its 
authority). 
 18 See, e.g., Gudula Geuther, Wert des Rechts in Zeiten der Bedrohung, DEUTSCHLANDFUNK 
(Apr. 20, 2016), http://blogs.deutschlandfunk.de/berlinbruessel/2016/04/20/wert-des-rechts-in-
zeiten-der-bedrohung/ [https://perma.cc/ZH2N-ZFBB] (describing the case as a “milestone in data 
protection”) (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 19 See infra notes 151–562 and accompanying text. 
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count for more than “the right to be let alone.”20 In the light of this odd in-
consistency, it is fair to question whether it is accurate to portray German 
law—as it is now canonized in the BKA-Act Case—as a model for the en-
lightened respect for privacy and individual liberty. The Constitutional 
Court’s defenders will argue that its measured jurisprudence is an unavoid-
able consequence of the fact that, in Germany, judicial review means the 
application of the proportionality principle. In that framework, constitution-
al privacy protection mostly involves an act of balancing that almost always 
concedes the state’s authority to encroach on basic rights (often in extreme 
ways) as long as the investigative measures are tangled up in a web of mi-
nute, finely-detailed procedures. German constitutional privacy protection, 
despite the respect it enjoys, remains just one interest that ought to be max-
imized alongside other interests to the extent possible. In Germany, despite 
the hype, privacy is not an absolute right. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I present the background to 
the BKA-Act Case, including an introduction to the BKA and a survey of the 
history of the amended BKA-Act.21 In Part II, I undertake a thorough analysis 
of the BKA-Act Case.22 In the Conclusion, I offer my critique of the case, ar-
guing that the Constitutional Court is overly active in a field that demands 
greater deference to the parliament and that, in any case, leads to a propor-
tional jurisprudence that is merely a pantomime of privacy.23 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and Its Evolution 
The BKA was originally envisioned as a national clearinghouse for the 
facilitation of the federal states’ nearly exclusive competence over law en-
forcement.24 The BKA’s mandate was limited to “combatting common crime 
to the degree that it transcends the territory of a single state.”25 The first 
federal law establishing the BKA affirmed that the prevention and prosecu-
tion of criminal activities would “remain a state competence.”26 The decen-
tralization of law enforcement power mirrored the general commitment to 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
 21 See infra notes 24–96 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 97–562 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 563–586 and accompanying text. 
 24 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 73(1)[10] (granting Germany’s federal govern-
ment the sole legislative power over law enforcement). 
 25 Gesetz über die Einrichtung eines Bundeskriminalpolizeiamtes (Bundeskriminalamtes) 
[BKAG] [Federal Criminal Police Office Act], Mar. 8, 1951, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 
165, § 1 (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 26 Id. § 4 (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
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administrative federalism in Germany’s post-war constitutional order.27 In 
this scheme, the federation largely bears the responsibility for enacting law, 
which, in turn, is implemented by public authorities organized and main-
tained by the states.28 Substantive and procedural criminal law in Germany, 
for example, is provided by the Federal Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch––
“StGB”) and Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung––
“StPO”).29 Yet the enforcement of the criminal law—prevention, investiga-
tion, and prosecution—is carried out by the states’ criminal police offices 
(Landeskriminalämter), prosecuting attorneys (Staatsanwaltschaften), and 
courts (Gerichte). It is widely accepted that the federation was denied these 
law enforcement powers, especially the intrusive power to investigate crim-
inal activity, as an acknowledgment of the great harm perpetrated by cen-
tralized police power during the National Socialist era.30  
Yet, the history of the BKA is a tale of the gradual expansion of the 
agency’s mandate. The BKA website credits this trajectory to “social and 
political developments as well as technical progress.”31 The former particu-
larly refers to the domestic, left-wing terrorism that gripped West Germany 
during the 1970s and 1980s.32 As early as 1973, as the long struggle with 
the Rote Armee Fraktion (“Red Army Faction”) was just dawning, the 
BKA-Act was amended to give the BKA a leading role in coordinating in-
vestigative communications and maintaining investigative data throughout 
the country.33 More significantly, the 1973 legislation gave the BKA origi-
                                                                                                                           
 27 DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 114–23, 143–45 (3d ed., rev. 2012) (detailing Germany’s 
federalism structure and the role of local administrative authority). 
 28 Id. 
 29 See generally STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/StPO.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JHR-3TQP]; STRAFGESETZBUCH 
[STGB] [PENAL CODE], https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/StGB.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P7K-
WBQ2]. 
 30 DAVID P. CONRADT & ERIC LANGENBACHER, THE GERMAN POLITY 300–01 (10th ed. 
2013); George E. Berkley, Centralization, Democracy, and the Police, 61 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE 309, 309 (1970). 
 31 The BKA, BUNDESKRIMINALAMT, https://www.bka.de/EN/Home/home_node.html [https://
perma.cc/GQL2-NUGX]. 
 32 See Hans-Ludwig Zachert, Former President of the BKA, Remarks at the Bonn House of 
History Conference on Freedom and Security: Historie des BKA—Von den Gründungsjahren zur 
Gegenwart 10–12 (June 17, 2011), https://www.bka.de/DE/DasBKA/Historie/STVeranstaltung/
stVeranstaltung_node.html (follow “Historie des BKA—Von den Gründungsjahren zur Gegen-
wart” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/8Q3A-DK29] (providing a synopsis of the history of the BKA). 
In the beginning of the 1970s the Federal Criminal Police Office saw increases in personnel and 
resources due in part to the fight against the Red Army Faction. Id. at 9. 
 33 Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Einrichtung eines Bundeskriminalpo-
lizeiamtes [Bundeskriminalamtes] [Second Act Amending the Act Establishing a Federal Criminal 
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nal investigative responsibility over a modest slate of crimes.34 Former 
BKA President Hans-Ludwig Zachert called this an “epochal leap forward” 
for the agency.35  
As with many other federal institutions, reunification prompted further 
reform of the BKA’s brief. The 1997 BKA-Act, for example, gave the agen-
cy investigative responsibility for enforcing section 129a of the Federal 
Criminal Code,36 which outlaws the formation of “criminal” or “terrorist” 
organizations.37 For the fulfillment of its duties, the 1997 BKA-Act gave 
the agency the authority to collect, store, use, and transfer personally-
revealing information.38 This power extended to secret measures deployed 
far in advance of the commission of a crime, in particular when a specific 
case involved threats to life, physical safety, or liberty.39 These measures, 
however, were subject to a strict set of statutory restrictions. For example, 
they could be implemented only when necessary and only for the prosecu-
tion of serious crimes or the prevention of grave threats.40 In addition, sec-
tion 12 of the 1997 BKA-Act added explicit data-protection measures to the 
regime.41 Finally, the 1997 BKA-Act prohibited new uses of the infor-
mation collected and maintained by the agency, and it imposed reporting 
and deletion requirements with respect to the agency’s information-
gathering initiatives.42 
The BKA’s evolution continued throughout the 2000s, largely in re-
sponse to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. 
German counter-terrorism capacities became a central part of the reaction to 
those events because a number of the 9/11 terrorists had lived in Ham-
burg—perhaps plotting the attacks—without being detected.43 Legislation 
                                                                                                                           
Police Office], June 30, 1973, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 701, § 2; A.F. Carter, The West 
German “Bundeskriminalamt,” 49 POLICE J. 199, 201, 203–04 (1976). 
 34 Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Einrichtung eines Bundeskriminalpo-
lizeiamtes [Bundeskriminalamtes] [Second Act Amending the Act Establishing a Federal Criminal 
Police Office], June 30, 1973, BGBL I at 701, § 4 (giving the BKA authority over certain weap-
ons-related crimes, and attacks on federal government agents, for example). 
 35 Zachert, supra note 32, at 9 (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 36 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz [BKAG] [Federal Criminal Police Office Act], July 7, 1997, 
BGBL I at 1650, § 4(1)[3]–[4]. 
 37 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], last amended by Gesetz [G], May 30, 2016, 
BGBL I at 1254, § 129a. 
 38 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz [BKAG] [Federal Criminal Police Office Act], July 7, 1997, 
BGBL I at 1650, § 7. 
 39 Id. §§ 15, 23–25. 
 40 Id. §§ 7–9. 
 41 Id. § 12. 
 42 Id. §§ 30–32. 
 43 Carol J. Williams, German Terror Cell’s Link to 9/11 Detailed, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/aug/30/world/fg-hijack30 [https://perma.cc/5RV6-VN4G]. 
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enacted in Germany while the World Trade Center rubble was still smolder-
ing constituted “a direct response to the 9/11 attacks, aiming to rectify the 
legal loopholes that allowed Al-Qaeda terrorists to use Germany as a lo-
gistic sanctuary.”44 The BKA’s original investigative competence was again 
expanded to include cyberattacks on Germany.45 The agency’s authority to 
root out and prevent crimes was also enhanced. It gained greater access to 
diverse information stored across public and private sources, which was to 
be used as the raw material needed to pursue data-mining and data-profiling 
programs.46 Still, most of the post-9/11 reforms did not fundamentally alter 
the states’ entrenched priority over criminal law enforcement.47 
One post-9/11 development involved the creation of a Joint Counter-
terrorism Center (Gemeinsame Terrorismusabwehrzentrum—“GTAZ”) for 
the integration of “police and intelligence analysis capacities in the area of 
Islamic terrorism/extremism across all government levels.”48 The BKA is 
one of the participating agencies at the GTAZ, a platform that aims to facili-
tate cooperation and information exchange among Germany’s many federal 
and state law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The GTAZ does not 
have independent authority in the fields of law enforcement or intelligence-
gathering and it does not have an independent director.49 Instead, more than 
a dozen autonomous agencies have assigned liaison staff to the GTAZ’s 
new Berlin campus. The highly-cherished separation (Trennungsgebot) of 
law enforcement’s power to investigate and prosecute crimes,50 on the one 
hand, and the intelligence community’s threat-analysis and intelligence-
                                                                                                                           
See generally TERRY MCDERMOTT, PERFECT SOLDIERS: THE 9/11 HIJACKERS: WHO THEY WERE, 
WHY THEY DID IT (2006) (discussing in detail the lives of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks). 
 44 HELLMUTH, supra note 5, at 90; see Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terroris-
mus [TBG] [Act to Combat International Terrorism], Jan. 9, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 
I at 361. 
 45 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus [TBG] [Act to Combat Interna-
tional Terrorism], Jan. 9, 2002, BGBL I at 361, art. 10(1). 
 46 See id. at art. 10(2); HELLMUTH, supra note 5, at 90. 
 47 See HELLMUTH, supra note 5, at 90–91 (noting that critics viewed the reforms as simply 
disguised iterations of already-existing “policy blueprints”). 
 48 Id. at 99. 
 49 Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ—Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre), 
BUNDESAMT FÜR VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ, https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-of-work/
islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/gtaz-en [https://perma.cc/F3VP-8QF3]. 
 50 See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Com-
parative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 527 (2007) (comparing 
the U.S. FBI’s lack of distinction between law enforcement and intelligence activities with Ger-
many’s strict separation policy). See generally CHRISTOPH STREIß, Das Trennungsgebot Zwischen 
Polizei und Nachrichtendiensten: Im Lichte aktueller Herausforderungen des Sicherheitsrechts, in 
12 RECHTSPOLITISCHES SYMPOSIUM (2011) (discussing the need to separate law enforcement 
from intelligence operations in order to protect both individual safety and freedom). 
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gathering powers, on the other hand, is preserved through a number of not-
completely convincing formalities.51 Participating agencies on either side of 
the law enforcement/intelligence divide, for example, are housed in separate 
buildings at the GTAZ campus.52 Furthermore, agents from the two sectors 
only communicate and cooperate through provisional working groups, re-
source pooling, and at daily briefings.53 The BKA—and the GTAZ itself—
credit this new cooperative infrastructure with helping to uncover the terror-
ist plot of the so-called Sauerland Group in 2007.54 
Another post-9/11 reform involved the establishment of a joint Coun-
ter-terrorism Database (Antiterrordatei—“ATD”).55 The founding law ex-
plained that, under the direction of the BKA, the ATD would consist in a 
“joint, standardized and centralized counter-terrorism database” on behalf 
of all of Germany’s federal and state law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies.56 Nearly forty security agencies are obliged to contribute to this 
easily-accessible, networked database,57 which contains a comprehensive 
catalogue of information about suspects, including their communications da-
ta, residences, banking practices, nationality, transport and weapons certifica-
tions, contact persons, and religious affiliations.58 The ATD faced a constitu-
tional challenge before the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 2013 that 
the basic structure of the database was compatible with the constitutional 
right to informational self-determination.59 But, prefiguring the Constitu-
tional Court’s approach to the BKA-Act Case, the Constitutional Court’s 
First Senate objected on constitutional grounds to a number of the details of 
the ATD framework.60 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Marc Engelhart, The National Socialist Underground (NSU) Case: Structural Reform 
of Intelligence Agencies’ Involvement in Criminal Investigations?, in PRIVACY AND POWER: A 
TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE NSA-AFFAIR, supra note 14, at 375–400 
(discussing the structure and function of various German intelligence agencies). 
 52 HELLMUTH, supra note 5, at 100. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Nicholas Kulish, Germany Sentences 4 in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/world/europe/05germany.html [https://perma.cc/HP72-XCN8] 
(detailing the take-down of the Sauerland cell, responsible for the 2005 attacks in London). 
 55 Antiterrordateigesetz [ATD] [Counter-Terrorism Database Law], Dec. 22, 2006, BUN-
DESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 3409, §§ 1, 3; HELLMUTH, supra note 5, at 104–07. 
 56 Antiterrordateigesetz [ATD] [Counter-Terrorism Database Law], Dec. 22, 2006, BGBL I at 
3409, § 1 (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 57 Zachert, supra note 32, at 16–17. 
 58 Antiterrordateigesetz [ATD] [Counter-Terrorism Database Law], Dec. 22, 2006, BGBL I at 
3409, § 3. 
 59 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 24, 2013, 133 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 277, 2014. 
 60 See generally id. (holding parts of sections 1–3 and 5 of the Counter-Terrorism Database 
Act, regarding collection and maintenance of data, incompatible with the Basic Law). 
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B. 2008 Amendments to the BKA-Act 
Despite the far-reaching reform implemented in the first years after 
9/11, the German states largely retained their entrenched priority over crim-
inal law enforcement. That finally changed with the substantial innovation 
achieved by the amendments to the BKA-Act approved at the end of 
2008.61 This is the law with which the Constitutional Court’s BKA-Act Case 
was concerned. A summary of the amended BKA-Act’s provisions is neces-
sary at this stage to help detail the significance of the changes it prescribed, 
and because the Constitutional Court’s BKA-Act Case decision engages fix-
edly—and formalistically—with the concrete terms of the new law. 
As a starting point, it must be said that the 2008 amendments to the 
BKA-Act would not have been possible without major federalism reform in 
2006, granting the federation  
exclusive legislative power with respect to . . . protection by the 
Federal Criminal Police Office against the dangers of internation-
al terrorism when a threat transcends the boundary of one Land, 
when the jurisdiction of a Land’s police authorities cannot be per-
ceived, or when the highest authority of an individual Land re-
quests the assumption of federal responsibility . . . .62 
Dorle Hellmuth tells the remarkable and winding story of the political 
struggle to reframe the BKA’s authority after the constitutional barriers had 
been eliminated.63 At the time, its critics saw the new BKA-Act as a “dark 
day for basic rights,” and agonized that it created a “German FBI.”64 The 
“Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense Against 
the Threat of International Terrorism” added nearly thirty new provisions to 
the 1997 BKA-Act. The BKA’s original competence over threats posed by 
international terrorism was secured by the new section 4a.65 This included 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bun-
deskriminalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the De-
fense Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083 (amending 
the original 1997 BKA Act). 
 62 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 73(1)[9a]; see Gunlicks, supra note 7, at 120 (dis-
cussing Article 73). Land is the German term for “country,” but in the context of the German 
federal state the term refers to one of the sixteen federal states that constitute the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
 63 See HELLMUTH, supra note 5, at 99–115 (describing the development of the new GTAZ in 
the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings). 
 64 Opposition spricht, supra note 9. 
 65 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
nalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense 
Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, § 4a. 
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the investigation and prosecution of the actions covered by section 129a of 
the German Criminal Code, which criminalizes the formation of terrorist 
organizations, defined as organizations whose aims include aggravated 
murder, genocide, war crimes, or crimes against personal liberty.66 To carry 
out this new counter-terrorism competence, the 2008 law granted the BKA a 
slate of new investigative powers, including the following (identifying only 
those that played a central role in the Constitutional Court’s 2016 decision): 
• authority to collect personally-revealing data;67 
• authority to subpoena information;68 
• authority to take special measures to collect information (regular per-
sonal observation, use of technology to conduct surveillance outside 
the home, and use of informants and undercover agents);69 
• authority to use technology for surveillance inside and outside the 
home;70 
• authority to conduct data-mining;71 
• authority to secretly intrude on, manipulate, and collect data from in-
formation-technology systems;72 
• authority to conduct telecommunications surveillance;73 and 
• authority to collect telecommunications meta-data.74 
The BKA Act, as amended by the 2008 Act, also authorized the BKA’s 
cooperation with external security agencies, including non-E.U. entities. In 
particular, the law authorized the transfer of the information it might obtain 
from the exercise of its intrusive new investigative powers.75 None of this, 
however, constituted a blank check. In two ways, the 2008 law imposed a 
number of limitations on the BKA’s use of its new competences. 
                                                                                                                           
 66 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], last amended by Gesetz [G], May 30, 2016, 
BGBL I at 1254, § 129a. 
 67 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
nalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense 
Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, § 20b. 
 68 Id. § 20c. 
 69 Id. § 20g. 
 70 Id. § 20h. 
 71 Id. § 20j. 
 72 Id. § 20k. 
 73 Id. § 20l. 
 74 Id. § 20m. 
 75 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz [BKAG] [Federal Criminal Police Office Act], July 7, 1997, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 1650, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 26, 2016, BGBL I at 
1818, § 14, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bkag_1997/BKAG.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9ZV-
GFLW]. Bundeskriminalamtgesetz [BKAG] [Federal Criminal Police Office Act], July 7, 1997, 
BGBL I at 1650.  
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First, the powers were authorized only in relation to threats or crimes 
of a particularly serious nature, and they could only be deployed against 
specifically identified individuals.76 In general terms, for example, section 
4a restricted the BKA to investigations involving national threats, to cir-
cumstances in which the jurisdiction of a state criminal police office cannot 
be recognized, and to cases in which a state agency asks the BKA to assume 
investigative responsibility.77 Furthermore, section 4a limited the BKA’s 
involvement in the criminal investigation of terrorist organizations—section 
129a StGB—to cases in which the suspected activities aimed to substantial-
ly disturb the public, violently threaten domestic or international institu-
tions, or destroy the foundational political, constitutional, or economic 
structures of a state, the federation, or an international organization.78 Many 
of the new, discrete investigative powers also contained their own subject 
matter and personal restrictions. Section 20h, as an example of the former, 
permitted technological surveillance outside the home only in cases involv-
ing “an imminent threat to the survival or security of the state, or to the life, 
limbs, or freedom of a person, or property having meaningful value and the 
preservation of which is in the public interest.”79 Or, as an example of the 
latter, section 20b limited the BKA’s authority to collect personally-
revealing information to only the targeted suspect and to third parties who 
are “not merely casually or accidentally connected with the suspect and 
who had knowledge of the criminal enterprise or who might benefit from 
the criminal enterprise.”80 
Second, the entire regime was framed by a number of procedural re-
strictions, including general protections and discrete, provision-specific pro-
tections. Section 11, which imposed a record-keeping obligation on the 
BKA when it exercised its new authority to collect information, is an exam-
ple of the general procedural protections provided by the 2008 amendments 
to the BKA-Act.81 Section 16 had a similar character in that it generally 
required the BKA to terminate any investigative measure being conducted 
inside a home if there is an intrusion on the intimate zone of privacy that 
German constitutional jurisprudence refers to as the “core-area for the pri-
vate arrangement of one’s life” (Kernbereich privater Lebensgestaltung).82 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
nalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense 
Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, § 4a. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. § 20h(1) (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 80 Id. § 20b(2)[1] (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 81 Id. § 11. 
 82 Id. § 16. 
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Other general procedural protections provided by the 2008 law included 
judicial review of the investigative measures and the duty to inform those 
affected by the investigative measures.83 Many of the new investigative 
measures were also constrained by discrete, provision-specific procedural 
requirements. For instance, the special measures for the collection of per-
sonally-revealing information were limited in duration,84 and the measures 
had to be ordered by the director of the relevant unit of the BKA.85 The in-
trusions into a suspect’s information-technology systems authorized by sec-
tion 20k, as another example of a provision-specific procedural restriction, 
could be carried out so long as it was technologically assured that only 
those changes would be made to the information-technology system that 
would be necessary for the collection of data.86 The results of the data-
mining measures authorized by section 20j, as yet another example of dis-
crete procedural limits, were to be deleted “as soon as the object of the in-
vestigative measure was achieved or proved to be impossible to achieve.”87 
This is not a comprehensive accounting of the detailed and highly-
technical features of the 2008 amending law. But, before I more thoroughly 
describe the Constitutional Court’s equally technical and detailed judgment 
in the BKA-Act Case, this summary demonstrates two points. First, it might 
suggest why the BKA’s new powers stirred so much alarm. The BKA ac-
quired newly-expansive original jurisdiction to conduct counter-terrorism 
criminal investigations. At the same time, the agency was given deeply-
intrusive investigative powers that were fairly portrayed in the media as, 
among other Orwellian possibilities, the authority to “conduct around-the-
clock surveillance, not only acoustical but also optical, even in a person’s 
bathroom and bedroom.”88 Second, it should suggest the complexity of the 
challenged regime’s framework that encompassed: the general grant of inves-
tigative authority, but limited to only a variety of subject matter circumstanc-
es; the concreteness and imminence of a suspected threat or criminal action; 
the grant of specific investigative measures, some with variable scope de-
pending on the nature of the threat justifying the investigation, the depth of 
the measure’s intrusion on privacy, and the attenuation of the affected per-
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. §§ 20v, 20w. 
 84 Id. § 20g(2)[1]. 
 85 Id. § 20g(3). 
 86 Id. § 20k(2)[2]. 
 87 Id. § 20j(3) (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 88 BKA-Gesetz ist teilweise verfassungswidrig, ZEIT ONLINE (Apr. 20, 2016, 10:13 AM), http://
www.zeit.de/digital/2016-04/bka-gesetz-zu-terrorbekaempfung-ist-teilweise-verfassungswidrig 
[https://perma.cc/RR2T-EZG9] (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
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son’s links to the threat; and a wide-range of general and specific procedural 
protections. 
Despite all the unease it fostered, it is not at all clear that the 2008 law 
turned the BKA into the ravenous, liberty-disregarding avatar of the Ameri-
can FBI that its critics feared (if that is at all a justifiable characterization of 
the FBI). As expected, the German Federal Government strenuously disput-
ed this portrayal at the oral hearing before the Constitutional Court’s First 
Senate in the BKA-Act Case.89 Federal Interior Minister, Thomas de 
Maiziere, and BKA President, Holger Münch, argued that the new measures 
had been applied with great restraint.90 They cited only fifteen cases in 
which the BKA had taken actions under its new counter-terrorism investiga-
tive competence (section 4a).91 They also claimed that, pursuant to that au-
thority, the BKA had implemented just one online search of a suspect’s in-
formation-technology systems (section 20k) and undertaken telecommuni-
cations surveillance measures on only four occasions (section 20l).92 One 
external assessment confirmed the modest nature of Germany’s domestic 
surveillance practices (relative to the practices of the equivalent American 
and English agencies), due in large part to the German agency’s very lim-
ited budgetary and technological capacities.93 But with little public infor-
mation about the BKA’s implementation of the new measures available, it is 
impossible to assess the credibility of these claims. In fact, one of the duties 
imposed on the BKA by the Constitutional Court’s judgment in the BKA-
Act Case is an obligation to document and report to the parliament about the 
uses it makes of the new investigative measures.94  
Still, and not only because of its institutional interests in the matter, there 
is reason to question the BKA’s candor and propriety. In recent years, the 
agency has been mired in a scandal suggesting it neither acted objectively nor 
with appropriate speed with respect to evidence the agency obtained that im-
plicated a high-ranking parliamentarian and a senior member of the BKA 
staff in the purchase of child pornography.95 At the very least, the insights 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 European Parliament Directorate-Gen. for Internal Policies, Policy Dep’t C: Citizens’ 
Rights & Constitutional Affairs, National Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal Data in 
EU Member States and Their Compatibility with EU Law, at 19–26, PE 493.032 (2013), http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/2_poldeptc_study_/2_poldeptc_
study_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T63-XL6Q]. 
 94 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 141 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 220 (285), 2017. 
 95 E.g., Philipp Alvares de Souza Soares & Hubert Gude, Fall Edathy: Auch BKA-Spitzenbeamter 
stand auf Kinderporno-Kundenliste, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 28, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.
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gained into the BKA’s professionalism during the resulting parliamentary in-
vestigation do not inspire confidence in the agency’s commitment to trans-
parency and objectivity, or its willingness to regulate itself.96 
II. THE BKA-ACT CASE 
The BKA-Act Case involved constitutional challenges to a controver-
sial expansion of the BKA’s powers in the area of counter-terrorism. De-
spite the Federal Government’s assertion that its modest use of these powers 
did not merit the unease stirred by the 2008 law, the BKA-Act’s fate before 
the Constitutional Court was predictable. In light of its recent jurisprudence 
in the privacy and security area,97 the Constitutional Court was destined to 
scrutinize the law’s provisions for their proportionality and to conclude, in 
the end, that the law should survive—but only if the legislature narrowed 
the provisions’ possible effects with a number of judicially-ordained specif-
ic, and sometimes highly-technical, limitations. 
The framework for review the Constitutional Court was bound to ap-
ply to the BKA-Act Case, including the various components that were re-
peated throughout the Constitutional Court’s recent jurisprudence, can be 
reduced to three steps in its proportionality analysis.98 
In the first step, the Constitutional Court would discuss the signifi-
cance of the basic rights implicated by the surveillance measures. These 
would involve Basic Law Articles 10(1) (telecommunications privacy), 
13(1) (inviolability of the home), and 1(1) (human dignity) in conjunction 
                                                                                                                           
spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bka-spitzenbeamter-befand-sich-auf-edathy-liste-a-956362.html 
[https://perma.cc/9FEN-PMV4] (asserting that high-up BKA officials possessed child pornography); 
Von Tanjev Schultz, Gutachten im Fall Edathy rügt Bundeskriminalamt, SÜDDUETSCHE ZEITUNG 
(Aug. 4, 2015, 6:21 PM), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kinderporno-affaere-gutachten-im-fall-
edathy-ruegt-bundeskriminalamt-1.2594941 [https://perma.cc/78BW-LTZV] (explaining that an 
expert report on the Edathy child pornography case reprimanded the BKA for failing to take ap-
propriate investigative action). 
 96 Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht [Resolution and Report], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHE [BR] 18/1948, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/019/1801948.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5KF8-JNDV]; see Soares & Gude, supra note 95 (criticizing the BKA’s willingness to 
police its own members). 
 97 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 2010, 125 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 260, 2010 (Data-Retention 
Case); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008, 120 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 274, 2009 (Online Search 
Case); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 2004, 109 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 279, 2004 (Acoustical Sur-
veillance Case). 
 98 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 27, at 67 (describing the “three-step process” in the 
Constitutional Court’s proportionality analysis). 
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with 2(1) (personal freedom).99 Some particular constitutional interests would 
play important roles in the case, including the right to informational self-
determination and the right to the confidentiality and integrity of information-
technology systems. The absolute respect owed to the “core-area for the pri-
vate arrangement of one’s life” also would be significant. Finally, in this 
first step, the Constitutional Court would have to assess the severity of the 
intrusion on these protected interests. In doing so, it would show special 
concern for the ways new and ubiquitous technology permits deeply pene-
trating, mosaic glimpses into individuals’ private lives. 
In the second step, the Constitutional Court would have to determine 
the importance of the objective the BKA-Act provided as justification for 
the use of these new rights-infringing measures. Several concerns would be 
at stake here, particularly the state aim to promote paramount objectives in 
criminal law enforcement or threat prevention. This has often been charac-
terized as grave or serious crimes; a threat to the life, limbs, or freedom of 
an individual; or as a threat to the foundation or survival of the state. The 
Constitutional Court would insist that the state’s objectives be clearly and 
unambiguously identified in the statute. The Constitutional Court would 
also insist that the use of the information-gathering measures must be justi-
fied by concrete threats, involving specific targets that are confirmed by 
factual indications. 
In the third step, applying proportionality in a narrower sense, the 
Constitutional Court would assess whether a provision was adequately lim-
ited to produce only the acceptably minimal degree of intrusion on a basic 
right. For example, the Constitutional Court would demand that a provision 
is appropriately specific and clear. And it would determine if the law pro-
vides an appropriate range of procedural protections, including transparency 
requirements, judicial supervision, reporting requirements, strict require-
ments for the retention and deletion of information, and rules governing the 
further use or transfer of the information. 
This is precisely the approach the Constitutional Court’s First Senate 
followed in the BKA-Act Case, and it is the framework I follow in describ-
ing each part of this long and complex judgment. 
Following oral hearings held in July 2015, the Constitutional Court is-
sued its decision in the BKA-Act Case on April 20, 2016.100 The case, in-
volving scores of legislative provisions and involving the most sensitive and 
                                                                                                                           
 99 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], arts. 1(1), 2(1), 10(1), 13(1). 
 100 Id.; see Diana Niedernhöfer, Bundesverfassungsgericht prüft BKA-Gesetz, SÜDWEST 
PRESSE (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.swp.de/ulm/nachrichten/politik/Bundesverfassungsgericht-
prueft-BKA-Gesetz;art4306,3321688 [https://perma.cc/A3ZC-SP9U] (highlighting the concerns 
the Constitutional Court discussed with respect to privacy rights implicated by the BKA-Act). 
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technical issues, was always bound to be “sehr komplex und sehr zerklüftet” 
(“very complex and very differentiated”).101 It took the Constitutional Court 
eighty dense pages (including dissenting opinions from Justices Eichberger 
and Schluckebier) to settle the matter. As the Constitutional Court’s earlier 
jurisprudence in the privacy and security area made predictable, the law 
generally survived the Constitutional Court’s scrutiny. Only two provisions 
of the law were ruled unconstitutional and void.102 Several other provisions, 
however, were found to be incompatible with the Basic Law.103 In these 
instances, the Constitutional Court worked out exquisitely-detailed and ex-
tensive corrections that the parliament was ordered to implement before 
June 30, 2018.104 
I present my survey of the case in four parts. First, I offer some intro-
ductory and comparative reflections on the Constitutional Court’s judg-
ment.105 Second, I describe and comment on the Constitutional Court’s dis-
crete engagement with a number of the new investigative measures granted 
to the BKA by the amended BKA-Act.106 Third, I describe and comment on 
the Constitutional Court’s assessment of the general, broadly applicable 
procedural protections provided by the amended law.107 Fourth, I describe 
and comment on the Constitutional Court’s engagement with the new law’s 
provisions regulating the secondary use or the transfer of the investigative 
information the BKA acquires pursuant to its new powers.108 This final as-
pect of the Constitutional Court’s decision, especially to the degree that it 
outlined the constitutional parameters for transfers of the BKA’s investiga-
tive information to foreign security agencies, is particularly relevant to ob-
servers, commentators, intelligence community professionals, and policy-
makers outside of Germany. 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Niedernhöfer, supra note 100. Constitutional Court Justice Kirchhof used this phrase to 
introduce the matter at the oral arguments in the case. Id. 
 102 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 141 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 220 (351), 2017. Namely, 
sections 20h(1)[1]{c} and 20v(6)[5] were found constitutionally incompatible and void. Gesetz 
zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskriminalamt [BKA-
TerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense Against the Threat 
of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, §§ 20h(1)[1]{c}, 20v(6)[5]. 
 103 141 BVERFGE 220 (352). 
 104 Id. at (351–52); see infra notes 151–562 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 109–150 and accompanying text.  
 106 See infra notes 151–370 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 371–437 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 438–562 and accompanying text. 
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A. Introductory and Comparative Reflections on the BKA-Act Case 
Two general features of the BKA-Act Case should be mentioned at the 
start, especially because they have such profound effects on the nature and 
style of the Constitutional Court’s decision. These introductory insights can 
be brought into focus by some comparative reflections. 
First, it is remarkable that the Constitutional Court could exercise ju-
risdiction over the case at all. The Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichtsgesetz) generally requires that parties bringing a complaint 
show that they have been “directly, personally, and presently affected” by the 
alleged constitutional violation.109 But the Constitutional Court has recog-
nized that secret investigations and intelligence-gathering represent an excep-
tion to this rule. The secrecy cloaking these state activities, the Constitutional 
Court has explained, means the surveillance might never be discovered by 
potential complainants and, consequently, that the state might be able to 
evade constitutional limits on the exercise of its power.110 The Constitutional 
Court ruled in previous cases that, in these circumstances, it would be 
enough to establish standing if the complainant can show “with some prob-
ability” that his or her constitutional rights have been harmed.111 The BKA-
Act Case is an example of this exception. The complainants pointed only to 
the mere existence of the amended BKA-Act—and not to a specific, proven 
instance of implementation by executive authorities that affected them per-
sonally—as the basis of their complaints.112 This was enough to satisfy the 
Constitutional Court, which noted that the complainants had no way of 
knowing whether they had been the objects of the BKA’s new investigative 
measures because of the secrecy shrouding the measures, and because the 
law lacked adequate reporting requirements.113 The Constitutional Court 
was satisfied, however, that the complainants’ political beliefs, professional 
activities, and unique private contacts created an adequate likelihood they 
had been affected by the challenged measures.114 This means that the Con-
stitutional Court considered the complaints to be challenges to the whole 
law, which it would review in total abstraction and not at all limited by the 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act], Aug. 11, 
1993, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 1474, last amended by Verordnung [V], Aug. 31, 2015, 
BGBL I at 1474, § 90 abs. 1, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bverfgg/BVerfGG.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R3J9-4B2A] (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 110 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 20, 1984, 67 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 157 (292–93), 1987.  
 111 Id. (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 112 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 141 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 220 (224–25, 241–42), 2017. 
 113 Id. at (241–42). 
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concrete facts of any specific circumstances involving any of the new inves-
tigative practices authorized by the amended BKA-Act. This unbounded 
examination of the legislation essentially functions as a form of abstract 
judicial review, even if it is formally brought as a constitutional complaint. 
Abstract review is unknown in the American judicial tradition.115 In-
stead, the U.S. courts strictly enforce the standing doctrine as part of the 
U.S. Constitution’s “controversies” requirement.116 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has not recognized an exception in intelligence cases. In his opinion 
for the U.S. Supreme Court in Clapper v. Amnesty International, Justice 
Alito said, “we have often found a lack of standing in cases in which the 
Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the political branches in 
the fields of intelligence-gathering and foreign affairs.”117 In Clapper, the 
U.S. Supreme Court found that rights advocates lacked standing to chal-
lenge the portions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act under which 
many of the NSA’s surveillance and data-collection programs operate be-
cause the advocates’ belief that their legitimate activities would nevertheless 
lead to surveillance was not enough to establish a “certainly impending” and 
“fairly traceable” constitutional injury.118 The U.S. Supreme Court insisted 
that “an objectively reasonable likelihood” that the plaintiffs’ communications 
would be intercepted at some point in the future was too attenuated and spec-
ulative to meet the standing doctrine’s “injury in fact” requirement.119 The 
U.S. Supreme Court was unconcerned that more definitive evidence of an 
injury would be nearly impossible to develop with respect to the NSA’s 
highly-secretive operations, noting in particular the importance of maintain-
ing the separation of powers—and judicial restraint generally—in the con-
text of the government’s intelligence-gathering activities.120 
Yet, these were precisely the circumstances under which the complain-
ants (who the Constitutional Court described as “human rights activists”) 
proceeded in the BKA-Act Case.121 Similarly attenuated circumstances 
                                                                                                                           
 115 KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 27, at 15. 
 116 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial authority over specific legal contro-
versies). 
 117 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). 
 118 Id. at 412–13, 422. 
 119 Id. at 410–11. 
 120 Id. at 408–09; see Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments for failure to show injury in fact) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 121 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 141 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 220 (241), 2017 (Russel A. 
Miller trans.). 
1566 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1545 
served as the basis for the Constitutional Court’s review in other prominent 
privacy and security cases in the last decade.122 
This exposes several prominent features of German jurisprudence, and 
the Constitutional Court’s BKA-Act Case in particular. On the one hand, 
generous jurisdictional standards pave the way for far-reaching judicial in-
volvement in this highly-sensitive field of policy-making. Where the Amer-
ican courts play an important but restrained role in the area of security, cau-
tiously policing the outer boundaries of executive power, the German Con-
stitutional Court plays the crucial role of a decisive player.123 On the other 
hand, the abstract posture of the Constitutional Court’s review means that it 
is free to rewrite the challenged legislation without being overly burdened 
by concerns about implementation, or constrained by the factual limits of a 
specific case, or the field generally. From this abstract posture, the Constitu-
tional Court was free to rewrite the BKA-Act to its liking. 
In addition, despite the almost revolutionary nature of the new, central-
ized investigative competences acquired by the BKA as a result of the 2006 
constitutional reform, the Constitutional Court devoted little reasoning to its 
summary conclusion that the new BKA-Act did not violate the Basic Law’s 
clear and forceful commitment to federalism.124 The Constitutional Court 
was satisfied that the BKA’s new powers were strictly confined to the inves-
tigation of crimes and threats clearly identified in section 4a(1) of the 
amended law,125 and that, in turn, section 4a was adequately aligned with 
the constitutional federalism reform achieved with the enactment of the 
Basic Law’s new Article 73(1)[9a].126 The Constitutional Court accepted 
these parameters as the proper limits on the federation’s power in these cir-
cumstances.127 Nor was the Constitutional Court bothered by the federalism 
implications of any overlap between the BKA’s new powers and the tradi-
tional investigative competences of the state law enforcement authorities. 
The Constitutional Court dismissed this concern with the explanation that 
the federalism amendments to the Basic Law had anticipated the intersec-
tion of these law enforcement competences.128 
                                                                                                                           
 122 E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 24, 2013, 
133 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 277, 2014; Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008, 120 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 274, 2009. 
 123 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 124 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 20(1) (designating Germany “a democratic and 
social federal state”) (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 125 141 BVERFGE 220 (263). 
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On this fundamental point, too, American constitutional law might 
have had greater cause to hesitate. In Bond v. United States, for example, 
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed the states’ prerogative in 
criminal law, explaining that 
[f]or nearly two centuries it has been clear that, lacking a police 
power, Congress cannot punish felonies generally. A criminal act 
committed wholly within a State cannot be made an offence 
against the United States, unless it have some relation to the exe-
cution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the juris-
diction of the United States.129 
Even where it could be said that federal criminal law was pursuing the fed-
eration’s interstate commerce clause authority, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded that there must be outer limits on the federation’s resort to criminal 
law.130 In their concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, for example, 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor agreed on the unconstitutionality of the 
Gun-Free Schools Zone Act (a federal law criminalizing gun possession 
near schools) in part by emphasizing the risk the federal criminal law posed 
to the states’ traditional authority over criminal law.131 Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that blurring this traditional allocation of state competences with an 
expansive federal role in law enforcement would undermine accountability 
and erode the states’ opportunities to experiment with and improve upon 
policies.132 Especially with respect to accountability, Justice Kennedy wor-
ried that citizens would be left with uncertainty regarding which of the “two 
governments,” state or federal, “to hold accountable for the failure to per-
form a given function.”133  
 In Bond, which involved a federal criminal prosecution based on 
America’s obligation to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention,134 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the challenged federal criminal au-
thority would “‘alter sensitive federal-state relationships,’ convert an aston-
ishing amount of ‘traditionally local criminal conduct’ into ‘a matter for 
federal enforcement,’ and ‘involve a substantial extension of federal police 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). 
 130 Id. at 2087. 
 131 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576–83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 576–77; see also Brandon L. Bigelow, The Commerce Clause and Criminal Law, 41 
B.C. L. REV. 913, 920 (2000) (discussing Lopez). 
 134 Chemical Weapons Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229(1)(a) (2012); Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weap-
ons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317. 
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resources.’”135 Confronted with these dangers, the U.S. Supreme Court in-
sisted that “the principle that Congress does not normally intrude upon the 
States’ police power” is critically important.136 The U.S. Supreme Court 
was forced to constrain what it saw as an overly expansive reading of feder-
al criminal law in order to prevent a “dramatic departure from that constitu-
tional structure and a serious reallocation of criminal law enforcement au-
thority between the Federal Government and the States.”137 
It is true that the reallocation of law enforcement competences in the 
context of the BKA-Act Case—implicating many of the same federalism 
concerns that animated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bond—had 
been achieved by way of a constitutional amendment. In most constitutional 
systems, a constitutional amendment authorizing the exercise of a discrete 
form of state power might be the end of any discussion about the constitu-
tionality of the competence in question.138 But, the Nazis’ manipulation and 
eventual debasement of the Weimar Constitution haunted the drafters of 
what was to be the new, postwar West German Constitution.139 To prevent 
this from happening again, the Basic Law provides a list of the values that 
were to animate and define the new West German state.140 Moreover, in Ar-
ticle 79(3), the Basic Law prohibits any amendments to those core princi-
ples.141 This provision is sometimes referred to as the “eternity clause” be-
cause it aims to secure a fundamental set of social and political commit-
ments, even from change by an amending supermajority, for as long as the 
Basic Law serves as Germany’s constitution.142 In practice, this means that 
the Constitutional Court can be called on to assess the permissibility of con-
stitutional amendments by testing their conformity to the Basic Law’s fun-
damental principles.  
After more than sixty years (and counting) of effective constitutional 
governance, Article 79(3) still stands as a sentinel, ensuring the security of 
the central aims of the Basic Law, giving them enduring—if not eternal—
                                                                                                                           
 135 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349–50 (1971)). 
 136 See id. at 2082. 
 137 Id. at 2093. 
 138 See generally Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) 
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sell A. Miller trans.). 
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 141 Id. at art. 79(3). 
 142 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 30, 
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effect and meaning.143 The principles secured by Article 79(3) include Ger-
many’s federalist structure, the supreme value of human dignity, representa-
tive democracy, a commitment to social welfare, and the rule of law.144 These 
unamendable commitments are so fundamental to the nature and character of 
the German state under the Basic Law that, together, they are sometimes re-
ferred to as Germany’s “constitutional identity,” and at other times as the 
core components of Germany’s “free democratic basic order.”145 
This distinct constitutional framework, providing for unamendable 
constitutional amendments, might have given the Constitutional Court 
scope to consider the federalism elements of the BKA-Act’s dramatic as-
signment of new law enforcement powers to the federation’s BKA.146 Crim-
inal law enforcement is a core prerogative of the states in Germany’s feder-
alism scheme,147 and the Basic Law’s federalism balance is among the fun-
damental principles meant to benefit from the protection of the eternity 
clause.148 The preservation of the states’ competences secured by Article 
79(3) would extend to any constitutional amendments that—either de jure 
or de facto—move Germany towards a unitary, centralized state, including 
measures that furtively strip the states of their essential competences.149 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court expressed no concerns about the way 
the new BKA-Act heavily shifted responsibility for criminal law enforce-
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Paul Kirchhof, Die Identität der Verfassung, in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER 
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 148 See Michael Sachs, Art. 79, in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1628, 1638 (Michael Sachs 
ed., 7th ed. 2014) (discussing the constitutional protections against amending Article 79). 
 149 Id. at 1642. 
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ment towards the federation. This could be the case because, as one com-
mentator remarked, “New Article 73(1)[9a] is only one of many exceptions 
to the fundamental principle recognizing the states’ sovereignty over law 
enforcement . . . . In fact, the Basic Law itself grants the federation a num-
ber of law enforcement responsibilities.”150 
With these preliminary issues settled, the Constitutional Court was free 
to engage directly and expansively with the amended BKA-Act. It would not 
be limited to a discrete set of facts arising from a concrete application of the 
BKA’s new investigative powers. Indeed, the Constitutional Court set about 
reviewing and recasting the provisions of the new law in exacting detail. 
B. Constitutionality of Specific Provisions Granting the BKA  
New Investigative Powers 
The Constitutional Court’s examination of the BKA’s new investiga-
tive powers followed its canonical proportionality analysis that requires the 
Constitutional Court to determine whether the challenged acts (in this case, 
the mere statutory authorization to act) serve a “legitimate aim,” and wheth-
er the measures undertaken are “suitable, necessary and . . . proportion-
ate.”151 This formalized structure for the Constitutional Court’s review of all 
exercises of public authority is not a mere (discretionary) interpretive de-
vice, as are the U.S. Supreme Court’s disputed “levels of scrutiny.”152 In-
stead, the Constitutional Court has ruled that proportionality analysis it-
self—and the restraint it necessarily imposes on state power—is part of the 
Basic Law’s commitment to the rule of law.153 In the BKA-Act Case, as I 
suggested earlier, this analysis can be reduced to three general steps that 
will frame my description of the Constitutional Court’s decision: (1) a dis-
cussion of the significance of the basic right that has been infringed by the 
challenged measure; (2) a discussion of the nature of the state interest justi-
fying the infringement upon the basic right; and (3) a discussion in which 
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the Constitutional Court weighs the harm produced by the rights infringe-
ment against the benefits the measure might achieve. Especially in the ap-
plication of the last of these steps, often referred to as proportionality in the 
narrow sense, in the BKA-Act Case the Constitutional Court was concerned 
with the ways in which the harmful consequences of the BKA’s new investi-
gative powers had been minimized, in part through the establishment of pro-
cedural protections. Finally, the Constitutional Court considered the chal-
lenged provisions’ respect for constitutionally mandated clarity and speci-
ficity.154 These elements, on the one hand, help to protect individuals’ inter-
ests by concretely limiting state power.155 On the other hand, they provide 
protection against state authority by facilitating judicial review.156 
Armed with this framework, the Constitutional Court considered the 
constitutionality of five of the new investigative powers granted to the BKA 
by the amended BKA-Act. 
1. Special Investigative Measures (section 20g) 
Section 20g of the amended BKA-Act authorized the BKA to pursue 
special investigative measures in limited circumstances.157 The special in-
vestigative measures included the use of: long-term observation, surveil-
lance technology outside the home (photography, filming, and audio sur-
veillance/recording), other technical means for observation (GPS-tracking, 
for example), informants, and undercover agents.158 These measures could 
be deployed to collect personally-revealing information with respect to 
three classes of investigations. First, the measures applied to “those who 
bring about a danger,”159 “those who own dangerous animals or things,”160 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 
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or in circumstances involving a “present significant risk.”161 In each of 
these cases the measures were to be limited to “a threat to the foundation or 
survival of the state; or to the life, limbs, or freedom of an individual; or to 
property having meaningful value and the preservation of which is in the 
public interest.”162 Second, the measures applied to persons about whom 
facts indicate that he or she will commit the crime of “organizing for the 
purpose of engaging in terrorism.”163 Third, the measures applied to the tar-
get’s “contacts or companions.”164 In all three of these investigative classes 
the BKA’s resort to the special investigative measures was to be limited to 
circumstances in which “defending against dangers or preventing crimes 
would otherwise be hopeless or substantially more difficult.”165 With lim-
ited exceptions, the special investigative measures had to be ordered by the 
Head of Unit (Abteilungsleitung) of the relevant BKA division.166 
In the first step of its analysis the Constitutional Court concluded that 
the special investigative measures anticipated by section 20g, despite the 
fact that they involved public conduct taking place outside the home, consti-
tuted a serious intrusion on the constitutionally-protected right to informa-
tional self-determination.167 In its “classical avant-garde” decision in the 
Census Act Case in 1983 the Constitutional Court drew this right out of the 
Basic Law’s protection of the free development of personality,168 insisting 
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that the individual have decisional authority over when and within what 
limits facts about his or her personal life shall be disclosed.169 In the Census 
Act Case, the Constitutional Court was particularly worried about the pre-
sent and prospective conditions of automatic data-processing that allow for 
the easy storage of, access to, and combination of data, all of which facili-
tates the production of “partial or virtually complete personality profiles.”170 
These “mosaic” concerns about privacy also surfaced in this part of the 
Constitutional Court’s assessment of section 20g. The Constitutional Court 
explained that the special investigative measures would prove to be espe-
cially intrusive and intense if some or all of the measures—aided by contin-
uing advances in technology—were bundled together in an operation 
against a single target, allowing the BKA to monitor and record nearly all 
communications and movements.171 
Despite the severe intrusion on the right to informational self-
determination that might result, in the second step of its analysis the Consti-
tutional Court found that the special investigative measures were justified by 
the general avoidance of harm to legal interests, the pursuit of serious crimi-
nal activity, and the public’s interest in an effective counter-terrorism re-
gime.172 The Constitutional Court explained that the new law’s focus on ter-
rorist threats and related crimes was properly aligned with European Union 
(“E.U.”) and international law, not to mention the 2006 amendment of the 
Basic Law.173 Terrorism, the Constitutional Court explained, aims to un-
dermine the foundations of the constitutional order and society itself.174 The 
use of effective investigative measures to defend against these threats, the 
Constitutional Court concluded, “constitutes a legitimate aim and is of great 
significance for a democratic and free basic order.”175 
                                                                                                                           
37 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 686–87 (1989) (discussing the “basis of a right of personality”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 169 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 65 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, 1987.  
 170 Id. (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 171 141 BVERFGE 220 (287). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at (266) (citing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of June 13 2002 on Com-
bating Terrorism, 2002 O.J. (L 164) 3 (EC) (no longer in force)); Measures to Eliminate Int’l 
Terrorism: Report of the Working Grp., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/65/L.10 (2010)). 
 174 141 BVERFGE 220 (266). 
 175 Id. (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 24, 
2013, 133 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 277, 2014; Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008, 120 ENTSCHEI-
DUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 274, 2009; and Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 2006, 115 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 320, 2007). 
1574 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1545 
It was in the third step of the Constitutional Court’s analysis that sec-
tion 20g encountered constitutional difficulties. The Constitutional Court 
found that the regime providing for the special investigative measures only 
partially satisfied constitutional specificity and proportionality require-
ments.176 In particular, the Constitutional Court objected to subtle components 
of sections 20g(1)[1]–[2] and 20g(3). 
The Constitutional Court was generally satisfied with the circumstan-
tial limitations built into section 20g(1)[1], which narrowed the application 
of the special investigative measures to situations involving the suspicion 
that specifically defined crimes might occur or that specifically defined 
threats exist.177 But, in the latter case, the Constitutional Court concluded it 
was constitutionally inadequate for section 20g(1)[1] to refer to threats to 
“property of substantial value.”178 It is not assured, the Constitutional Court 
explained, that a typical interpretation of the statute would lead to the con-
clusion that “property of substantial value,” in the context of counter-
terrorism measures, must refer to valuable, publicly important infrastructure 
and not just any tangible asset with value.179 This probing level of judicial 
“supervision” is typical of the Constitutional Court’s decision in the BKA-
Act Case and its role in German law and politics more generally.180 In this 
instance, for example, the Constitutional Court criticized the potential 
breadth of the legislation. But it is also dictated a narrow and particular pos-
sible interpretation of the provision that the Constitutional Court seemed to 
believe would have eluded the ordinary courts in their application and re-
view of the statute. From its seat in Karlsruhe, the Constitutional Court gave 
exact instructions on narrow points of construction to both the legislature 
and the ordinary courts. 
 Section 20g(1)[2] permitted the use of special investigative measures 
concerning targets about whom facts justified the assumption that he or she 
would commit a terrorist crime.181 The Constitutional Court was not satis-
fied that this language adequately limited the special investigative measures 
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to cases involving a greater degree of suspicion than a mere professional 
hunch (Erfahrungssätze).182 The Constitutional Court insisted that the 
measures be applied only on the basis of specific facts pointing towards a 
concrete and imminent act.183 The Constitutional Court demanded that there 
be evidence of individual behavior justifying the view that there is a con-
crete likelihood that in the immediate future a terrorist crime will be com-
mitted.184 The Constitutional Court concluded that section 20g(1)[2], which 
only anticipates the possible commission of a terror crime, did not require 
this more narrow frame.185 Finally, the Constitutional Court found that the 
procedural requirements of section 20g(3), generally applicable to the im-
plementation of the special investigative measures, were disproportionate 
and unconstitutional.186 
First, the regime’s provision for independent, external approval was 
inadequate. In most cases the law permitted senior BKA authorities to order 
special investigative measures without any involvement from the judiciary 
or other independent authorities.187 Only an original order authorizing the 
use of undercover agents (as envisioned by section 20g(2)[5]) required an 
external, independent order.188 Otherwise, external approval was only re-
quired for an extension—beyond the originally authorized timeframe—of 
the special investigative measures.189 Pursuing an extremely granular un-
derstanding of privacy (through its proportionality review), the Constitu-
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tional Court objected only to the fact that this system did not also require 
original independent approval (instead of mere agency approval) for long-
term personal observation (including photographic measures or the use of 
technology to facilitate observation), when non-public conversations are 
involved, or when informants are used.190 The Constitutional Court ex-
plained that in these cases some type of independent and external authoriza-
tion, beyond mere agency approval, was necessary at the outset and not on-
ly later, when an extension of the investigative measures is desired.191  
I have used the terms “external” or “independent” to describe the author-
ities the Constitutional Court would interpose on the original decision to au-
thorize special investigative measures in this marginally expanded list of cir-
cumstances because the Constitutional Court itself carefully avoids calling for 
a judicial role in these decisions. Instead, the Constitutional Court refers to 
“an independent body, such as a court.”192 With this cautious construction the 
Constitutional Court seems to want to avoid the suggestion that the judiciary 
plays a constitutionally mandated role in the protection of privacy against the 
state’s security-motivated intrusions. This might be necessary because Ger-
many’s Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) also does not 
have to be bothered with judicial approval when pursuing strategic intelli-
gence-gathering involving German targets. Instead, the orders for those secret 
operations are issued by the relevant ministries and are reviewed, in a highly-
dubious process, by the G10 Commission, a sui generis entity that is neither a 
parliamentary committee nor a judicial organ.193 
Second, in a theme that is repeated throughout the decision, the Consti-
tutional Court found that the general procedures did not provide explicit 
rules for the protection of the constitutionally sacrosanct “core-area for the 
private arrangement of one’s life.” It did not matter to the Constitutional 
Court that all the activities subject to the special investigative measures en-
visioned by section 20g would take place outside the home and in public 
settings. Especially in their intensity, the Constitutional Court reasoned, the 
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special investigative measures involved intrusions that cut perilously close 
to individuals’ “core area of private life,” which also exists in one’s car, at a 
restaurant, or during a secluded walk.194 For this reason the Constitutional 
Court ordered the legislature to provide clear rules ensuring the inviolability 
of this central privacy interest during the collection, analysis, and use of 
information acquired as a result of the special investigative measures.195 
The law, for example, must preclude the collection of information from the 
“core area of private life” to the degree practicable, especially with respect 
to information acquired from conversations conducted between highly-
trusted intimates.196 These limits on collection, the Constitutional Court in-
sisted, also must include rules that require the BKA to suspend immediately 
all investigative measures as soon as it becomes evident that the “core area of 
private life” is concerned.197 The Constitutional Court also demanded that, in 
order to protect the “core area of private life,” an independent authority pre-
screen all information prior to it being analyzed and used by law enforce-
ment.198 Finally, the Constitutional Court insisted that the law require the 
immediate deletion of highly-personal information—a procedure that must be 
fully documented to permit later judicial review of these actions.199 
2. Special Technical Investigative Measures Inside or Outside the Home 
(section 20h) 
The investigative powers granted under section 20h of the amended 
BKA-Act stirred intense unease because they anticipated intrusions into the 
private sanctum of the home, where the BKA would be allowed to conduct 
audio and video surveillance.200 Section 20h limited these invasive 
measures to many of the same fundamental boundaries that served to nar-
row the scope of the special investigative measures identified in section 
20g.201 First, this surveillance was to be confined to circumstances involv-
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1578 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1545 
ing “a threat to the foundation or survival of the state; or to the life, limbs, 
or freedom of an individual; or to property having meaningful value and the 
preservation of which is in the public interest.”202 Second, the BKA’s resort 
to this surveillance was to be limited to circumstances in which “defending 
against dangers or preventing crimes would otherwise be hopeless or sub-
stantially more difficult.”203 Third, the surveillance was limited to targets 
suspected of very specific crimes or threats, including “those who bring 
about a danger,”204 “those who own dangerous animals or things,”205 to per-
sons for whom facts indicate that he or she will commit the crime of organ-
izing for the purpose of engaging in terrorism,206 or the target’s contacts or 
companions.207 Yet, in one respect, the general limitations applied to this 
intrusive form of surveillance were narrower than those applied to the spe-
cial investigative measures provided by section 20g. Whereas the latter also 
could be implemented in circumstances involving a “present significant 
risk,”208 this open-ended possibility is not a basis for the surveillance in the 
home that was anticipated by section 20h.209 The narrowed field of applica-
tion of section 20h clearly reflected the legislature’s concern for the signifi-
cant privacy interests involved in this context. 
The statute also provided other, more specific limitations, both as to 
scope and with respect to the necessary procedures. For example, it limited 
the scope of surveillance to the residence of the targeted suspect, except 
when specific facts provide the assurance that the suspect will stay in an-
other residence and when limiting surveillance exclusively to the suspect’s 
residence will not lead to a defense against the threat.210 As a matter of pro-
cedure, section 20h required judicial authorization—on an application from 
the BKA’s president—for these intrusive measures, except for a three-day 
window during which the BKA itself could authorize the surveillance in an 
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emergency.211 These were higher standards than those applying to the spe-
cial investigative measures under section 20g, that, prior to the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision in the case, could be authorized by a mere BKA 
Head of Unit and, even after its decision in the case, were to be subjected to 
the review of an “independent body,” but not necessarily a court.212 The 
statute required that the order authorizing this exceptional form of surveil-
lance include a number of relevant details in writing.213 The order would 
also limit the surveillance to one month, with the chance of an additional 
one-month extension so long as the necessary preconditions exist.214 
Whether in the first month or in the extended period, the statute required the 
cessation of these surveillance measures at any point if the necessary pre-
conditions ceased to exist.215 
Finally, the statute provided specific limitations with a view to protect-
ing the highly-sensitive “core area of private life.” To this end, audio and 
video surveillance in the home was prohibited unless factual indications—
especially concerning the relationship between the targeted person and the 
places subject to surveillance—provided assurances that the “core area of 
private life” would not be affected by these measures.216 Even with these 
assurances, the statute required that surveillance immediately end if infor-
mation from the “core area of private life” were to become implicated.217 In 
the case of doubts about whether the “core area of private life” could be 
adequately isolated and left undisturbed, the statute permitted only automat-
ic recording, the subsequent use and deletion of which must be decided by a 
court.218 In any case, the statute prohibited the analysis of any information 
drawn from the “core area of private life.”219 The statute required that all 
information related to surveillance that might intrude on the “core area of 
private life” be documented for the exclusive purpose of review by data-
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protection authorities.220 The statute provided that this protocol may be re-
tained only until it would no longer be of use to the data-protection authori-
ties, or, at the latest, for one year.221 
The Constitutional Court objected to a number of elements in this nu-
anced statutory framework. In the first step of its analysis, the Constitution-
al Court concluded that the surveillance anticipated by section 20h of the 
amended BKA-Act constituted an especially weighty intrusion on the right 
to the inviolability of the home, as guaranteed by Basic Law Article 
13(1).222 This classical negative right223 is meant to protect the individual 
and their personal development by ensuring the protection of a living space 
where a person can retreat for privacy.224 The importance of the right can be 
deduced from two elements. First, Article 13 extends its protection to all 
people, and not just Germans.225 Second, Article 13 is not included among 
the basic rights susceptible to forfeiture if they are “abused.”226 Despite all 
of this, and despite the absolute terms in which the right is expressed,227 
Article 13 is one of the least successfully-invoked basic rights.228 This must 
especially be the case after the major revision of the right undertaken in 
1998.229 In five new, very detailed paragraphs, Article 13 now anticipates 
intrusions on residential privacy in clearly defined circumstances, including 
acoustical surveillance of the kind codified in section 20h of the amended 
BKA-Act.230 Still, the Constitutional Court found that the surveillance per-
mitted by section 20h was particularly grave, noting that the values and in-
terests promoted by Article 13 have a close nexus with human dignity.231 
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In the second step of its analysis, the Constitutional Court summarily 
concluded that the intrusive surveillance measures authorized by section 
20h were justified by the general avoidance of harm to legal interests, the 
pursuit of serious criminal activity, and the public’s interest in an effective 
counter-terrorism regime.232 As it had done at this point in its analysis of 
section 20g, the Constitutional Court merely pointed to an abstract treat-
ment of the legitimacy of the BKA-Act’s objectives that appeared in the 
decision’s introductory section.233 In this context, however, the Constitu-
tional Court viewed Basic Law Article 13(4) as profound confirmation that 
these security objectives endowed the surveillance measures with constitu-
tional legitimacy.234 
The surveillance measures of section 20h nonetheless encountered 
constitutional difficulties in the third step of the Constitutional Court’s 
analysis. The Constitutional Court found that the framework for specifying 
a target for these intrusive surveillance measures was disproportionate, and 
therefore unconstitutional.235 The Constitutional Court further ruled that 
section 20h did not provide adequate protection for the “core area of private 
life.”236 
Regarding the framework for specifying the target, the Constitutional 
Court explained that it was unobjectionable that the BKA-Act permitted the 
implementation of these surveillance measures in the homes of third par-
ties.237 This would be tolerable, the Constitutional Court explained, if the 
targeted suspect will be at the third-party residence and if the same infor-
mation could not be acquired by limiting the surveillance to the target’s 
home.238 Yet the Constitutional Court recalled that, in the Acoustical Sur-
veillance Case, it had imposed a number of limitations on surveillance in 
third-party residences to ensure the practice’s proportionality: there must be 
a concrete suspicion that the targeted person will be in the third-party resi-
dence at the time the surveillance takes place; a professional hunch would 
not be enough to justify surveillance of a third-party’s home; it must be very 
likely that surveillance of a third-party’s residence will produce information 
that is relevant to the investigation; and there must be evidence suggesting 
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that the targeted person will engage in conversations relevant to the investi-
gation.239 These safeguards were missing from section 20h.240 The Constitu-
tional Court also concluded that surveillance in third-party residences in 
order to monitor a suspect’s “contacts or accompanying persons,” as permit-
ted by section 20h(1)[1]{c}, was altogether too attenuated to be constitu-
tionally proportional.241 
With respect to the “core area of private life,” the Constitutional Court 
found that the deeply intrusive character of the surveillance measures au-
thorized by section 20h could have an impact on the human dignity ele-
ments of the right to privacy in the home that is secured by Basic Law Arti-
cle 13.242 For this reason, the Constitutional Court insisted that the strictest 
safeguards must be applied for the protection of the “core area of private 
life.”243 The Constitutional Court ruled that section 20h(5) failed to meet 
this high standard.244 Shortcomings were evident in the rules governing the 
collection of information via surveillance in the home.245 Shortcomings 
were also evident in the rules governing the analysis and use of information 
collected via surveillance in the home.246 
The Constitutional Court found, for example, that section 20h(5) 
should have clearly established a presumption against surveillance involv-
ing conversations between especially trusted confidants or intimates (Per-
sonen des höchstpersönlichen Vertrauens) that take place in the home.247 
The Constitutional Court explained that this circle of people includes mari-
tal or life partners, siblings and direct relatives—especially when they are 
living in the same home—some professional service providers (such as 
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criminal defense lawyers or doctors), and very close friends.248 The privacy 
of conversations with these people in one’s home must be preserved, the 
Constitutional Court noted, as a way of satisfying the deeply human need to 
express one’s dreams, sensitivities, feelings, and thoughts.249 The presump-
tion against surveillance of these conversations, the Constitutional Court 
ruled, can be overcome only if concrete evidence suggests that, with respect 
to a discrete conversation, criminal matters will be discussed.250 In these 
exceptional circumstances surveillance should proceed only for short peri-
ods of time and only with the use of automatic recording technology.251 
The Constitutional Court was mollified, however, by the fact that sec-
tion 20h(5) required judicial approval for the implementation of these sur-
veillance measures. The judiciary’s role also properly extended to decisions 
concerning the analysis and use of automatically recorded surveillance con-
tent, a practice the statute required if there was any uncertainty regarding 
possible exposure of the “core area of private life.”252 But the Constitutional 
Court found that this arrangement improperly limited the role of independ-
ent review.253 It was not enough, the Constitutional Court explained, that 
independent approval is necessary for the initial authorization of surveil-
lance in the home, on the one hand, and with respect to the analysis and use 
of this surveillance when the information is gathered through automatic 
means, on the other hand.254 The supervision of an independent authority is 
also required for the analysis and use of all information drawn from home 
surveillance that risks intrusions on the “core area of private life.”255  
It was an infinitely small gap, seemingly justified by the legislature’s 
belief that it would be adequate to have judicial involvement in deciding 
whether to proceed with surveillance in the first instance. Instead, the Con-
stitutional Court insisted that independent review was also necessary for the 
protection of core-area privacy concerning information that might slip 
through that initial screening and become relevant at the time the agency 
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sought to analyze or use the information.256 It is interesting to note that, 
throughout this part of the decision, the Constitutional Court took care to 
use the phrases “unabhängige Sichtung” (independent examination) and 
“unabhängige Kontrolle” (independent oversight) despite the fact that sec-
tion 20h(5) refers explicitly to a “Gericht” (court).257 It seems possible that 
the Constitutional Court could accept a role here for a non-judicial entity, 
such as the G10 Commission (which controls the Federal Intelligence Ser-
vice’s intelligence-gathering operations),258 or the Office of the Federal 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Bun-
desbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit).259 
3. Data-Mining (section 20j) and Online Searches of Information-
Technology Systems (section 20k) 
A remarkable element of the amended BKA-Act was the fact that the 
legislature granted investigative powers to the BKA that had recently been 
the subject of disapproving or cautionary decisions from the Constitutional 
Court. This dynamic provides some insight into the way the Constitutional 
Court’s detailed and far-reaching privacy and security jurisprudence is re-
ceived by policy-makers. It also provides a benchmark for assessing the 
Constitutional Court’s progressive dynamism in this field: how far ahead of 
the majoritarian policy-making institutions is the Constitutional Court able 
to stay? The BKA-Act Case sent mixed signals in these respects. For exam-
ple, the Constitutional Court found that the data-mining provisions of sec-
tion 20j satisfied the strict proportionality standard the Constitutional Court 
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applied in its 2006 Data-Mining Case.260 But, the Constitutional Court 
found that elements of the online computer surveillance permitted under 
section 20k of the BKA-Act were unconstitutional, despite the legislature’s 
efforts to adapt the regime to the standards the Constitutional Court had an-
nounced in the Online Search Case in 2008.261 The Online Search Case was a 
ground-breaking decision issued by the Constitutional Court while the gov-
ernment was preparing and negotiating the enactment of the amended BKA-
Act.262 I focus here on the Constitutional Court’s consideration of the BKA-
Act’s provisions authorizing the BKA to conduct online searches of infor-
mation technology systems. Once again, the outcome turned on concerns 
about the protection owed to the “core area of private life.” 
The German state’s desire to gain access to suspects’ computer systems 
has produced a “never-ending, embarrassing story.”263 Germans call the mal-
ware needed for such intrusions “Staatstrojaner” (a state Trojan horse).264 
The Constitutional Court scrutinized the practice of using Staatstrojaner (in 
state, as opposed to federal, law enforcement actions) in its 2008 Online 
Search Case, in which the Constitutional Court approved their use but only 
under the demanding privacy safeguards required by a newly-announced 
constitutional protection aimed at preserving the confidentiality and integri-
ty of information-technology systems.265 The years following the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision have seen a mess of technological and legal stum-
bles. In technological terms, the Federal government’s attempts to custom 
develop the malware have produced systems that were either thought to be 
able to do too much, or systems that were thought to be able to do too lit-
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tle.266 According to some reports, the latter problem surmounted the former. 
It seems the BKA’s malware could gain access only to online communica-
tions activities conducted via Skype and was blocked altogether by systems 
running Apple’s Mac or the Linux operating systems.267  
Despite the Government’s declared efforts to remain faithful to the pa-
rameters outlined in the Constitutional Court’s 2008 Online Search Case,268 
the provisions of section 20k also stirred widespread doubts about their 
constitutionality. The Chaos Computer Club269 lodged one of the sharpest 
rebukes. After hacking into and then analyzing the code of a preliminary 
version of the software, the Club called it a “program[m]ed constitutional 
violation.”270 Others expressed misgivings about the adequacy of the law’s 
protection of the “core area of private life,”271 or worried that the law was 
not properly limited to a narrow range of severe and concrete threats.272 
Yet section 20k was anything but a blank check authorizing unrestrict-
ed or thinly justified intrusions into information-technology systems. In-
stead, the power to encroach on and extract personally-revealing infor-
mation from this sphere was encased in layers of limitations relating to the 
following: the substantive circumstances in which such measures could be 
used, the implementation of strict technical conditions, the fulfillment of 
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extensive and precise procedural conditions, and the observation of special 
rules for the protection of the “core area of private life.”  
For example, as a substantive matter, section 20k was limited to in-
stances where specific facts justified the assumption that one of two kinds 
of dangers exist. The first danger involved threats to “an individual’s life, 
limbs, or freedom.”273 The second danger involved threats to “public goods, 
which, if imperiled, implicate either the foundation or survival of the state 
or the foundations of human existence.”274 The only exception to the narrow 
substantive scope of section 20k involved those circumstances in which, 
despite doubts about the likelihood of harm occurring in the near future, 
specific facts in a discrete case suggest that an identified individual poses a 
threat to “an individual’s life, limbs, or freedom.”275 Additional substantive 
limits applied in any case. Online searches, for example, could be undertak-
en only when necessary to advance the fight against international terrorism 
and only against “those who bring about a danger” or “those who own dan-
gerous animals or things.”276 As was typical throughout the BKA-Act 
amendments, the online search measures were permissible only if achieving 
these functional aims of the surveillance would otherwise be hopeless or 
substantially more difficult.277  
Alongside the substantive parameters for an online search section 20k 
also imposed technological limitations. For example, the information-
technology systems subject to the surveillance could be changed only in 
ways that were vital to the collection of the target data,278 and any such 
changes were to be automatically restored.279 Section 20k also imposed a 
number of procedural requirements on the BKA’s use of its new authority to 
conduct online searches. For example, the measures could be implemented 
only on the basis of an order issued by a court in response to an application 
from the BKA President.280 The order was to be in writing, with the relevant 
details, including the essential justifications for conducting the surveil-
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lance.281 The order also would limit the search to no more than three 
months, with the possibility of one three-month extension.  
Finally, as a fundamental procedural matter, section 20k(3) imposed 
detailed documentary requirements on the BKA in connection with the ex-
ercise of this new investigative power. With respect to each online search 
undertaken by the BKA, the agency was obliged to register the following: 
the form and nature of the technology used to conduct the search; infor-
mation about the target information-technology system and any changes 
made to that system in the course of the search; the information that justi-
fied the collection of information in this manner; and the division of the 
BKA responsible for carrying out the search.282 This documentation was 
itself subject to strict regulation. It could be used only for judicial or inde-
pendent review of online search initiatives, and it could be kept for no more 
than a year, at which time it must be deleted.283 
In light of this comprehensive framework, it is not surprising that the 
Constitutional Court concluded that “if given an interpretation that con-
forms to the constitution, especially with respect to its general provisions, 
section 20k is compatible with the Basic Law.”284 But the Constitutional 
Court found that the provisions concerned with the “core area of private 
life” did not satisfy the constitutional requirements.285 This conclusion 
obliged the Constitutional Court to conduct its full three-step analysis re-
garding section 20k. 
In the first step, the Constitutional Court found that the online searches 
anticipated by section 20k were a severe intrusion into the constitutionally 
protected right to the confidentiality and integrity of information-technology 
systems.286 The Constitutional Court first recognized this right in its 2008 
Online Search Case, in which it concluded that today’s ubiquitous use of 
technology—and the accompanying collection of data—requires that the 
Basic Law account for risks to privacy arising from the ever-larger role 
technology plays in our lives.287 This was not the declaration of a fully new 
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basic right,288 but instead an “updating and concretization of the general 
right to the free development of personality.”289 The protection is distin-
guished from other privacy protections codified in the Basic Law, including 
telecommunications privacy and the inviolability of the home.290  
It is also distinguished from other privacy concerns addressed by the 
general right to the free development of personality, particularly the right to 
informational self-determination.291 As formulated by the Constitutional 
Court in the Online Search Case the new privacy protection 
covers systems that, alone or in their technical networking, can 
contain personal data of the person concerned to such a degree 
and in such a diversity that access to the system facilitates insight 
into significant parts of the life of a person or indeed provides a 
revealing picture of a person’s personality. Such a possibility ap-
plies for instance to access to personal computers, regardless of 
whether they are installed in a fixed location or are operated 
while on the move. It is possible as a rule to conclude not only as 
regards use for private purposes, but also with business use, pos-
sible characteristics or preferences from the usage pattern. Specif-
ic fundamental rights-related protection also covers for instance 
mobile telephones or electronic assistants which have a large 
number of functions and can collect and store many kinds of per-
sonal data.292 
 The Constitutional Court insisted, however, that not all personal uses 
of technology involve the right to the confidentiality and integrity of infor-
mation-technology systems.293 Some technology, such as discrete household 
appliances, “only contains data with a partial connection to a certain area of 
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life of the person concerned,” and therefore does not risk the privacy intru-
sion that could result from access to a broad spectrum or mosaic of one’s 
private data.294 The protection is primarily concerned with the quantity, 
character, and diversity of the data that the state accesses.295 Anika Luch 
distilled the new right to three points: it applies to intrusions into a person’s 
complex information-technology systems (integrity), if those systems pro-
duce or contain large quantities of personally-revealing data (confidentiali-
ty), and the intrusion undermines a person’s sovereignty over the data he or 
she creates and stores (confidentiality).296 
The Constitutional Court, in the BKA-Act Case, endorsed this frame-
work and expanded it to cover the privacy interests people have in data held 
and stored by others as a result of the use of the internet and social media.297 
The Constitutional Court explained that these information-technology sys-
tems, and the data stored there, also are owed protection despite the fact that 
they do not involve one’s personal information-technology systems.298 
These data, the Constitutional Court concluded, can be of a highly-personal 
character—especially when combined—and are at risk of being manipulat-
ed, read, or captured from contexts in which individuals have the justified 
expectation of confidentiality.299 In light of all of this the Constitutional 
Court found that the provisions of section 20k constituted an especially in-
tense intrusion into the basic rights.300 
In the second step in its analysis the Constitutional Court summarily 
concluded that section 20k was adequately limited to surveillance aimed at 
protecting a preeminently important legal interest.301 This included concrete 
threats to “an individual’s life, limbs, or freedom,”302 concrete threats to 
“public goods, which, if imperiled, implicate either the foundations or sur-
vival of the state, or the foundations of human existence,”303 and less well-
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substantiated threats in discrete cases suggesting that an identified individu-
al poses a threat to “a person’s life, limbs, or freedom.”304 
In the third step of its analysis, the Constitutional Court found that sec-
tion 20k was proportional, especially because it limited the use of online 
search measures to very narrow substantive circumstances, it imposed nec-
essary technological preconditions on the searches, and it imposed adequate 
procedural safeguards on the searches.305 As noted earlier, however, the 
Constitutional Court concluded that section 20k did not satisfy the constitu-
tional standard of protection with respect to the “core area of private 
life.”306 This part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling focused on the provi-
sions of section 20k(7) that assigned to internal BKA agents the responsibil-
ity for reviewing the data collected from online searches in order to exclude 
information involving the “core area of private life.”307  
First, the Constitutional Court emphasized that online searches involved 
the “core area of private life” because the large amount of personally-
revealing data that might be accessed exceeds even the personal exposure that 
might result from intrusions into the sacrosanct sphere of the home.308 The 
Constitutional Court explained that the information-technology data exposed 
in these searches are not fleeting but can be stored for long periods, and the 
searches are not limited by space but can be carried out from almost any-
where.309 Second, despite the fact that online searches involve this uniquely 
troubling totality of personal privacy, the Constitutional Court was satisfied 
with the law’s formal prohibition on the collection of information from the 
“core area of private life,” and with the law’s demand that a technological 
filter be employed to enforce that prohibition.310 Third, the Constitutional 
Court nevertheless insisted that technological filters would not be able to per-
fectly isolate and exclude information touching on the “core area of private 
life.” To this degree, then, a likelihood remained that highly-confidential in-
formation would be captured through online searches, even if only on the 
margins of the initiatives. Fourth, the Constitutional Court expressed dismay 
that, in response to this residual but real risk, section 20k(7) called on BKA 
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agents to review all information collected through online searches in order 
filter-out information touching on the “core area of private life.”311  
Only an independent authority, the Constitutional Court concluded, 
would adequately minimize the harm to privacy that online searches risked.312 
The point of this control, the Constitutional Court explained, is that it should 
identify and exclude information from the “core area of private life” before it 
falls into the hands of the BKA.313 The Constitutional Court insisted that the 
control and review be conducted by independent authorities external to the 
BKA: “Yet the actual carrying out and decision-making responsibility must 
remain in the hands of persons who are independent with regard to the Feder-
al Criminal Police Office.”314 Again, it seems possible that the Constitutional 
Court had the Office of the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information in mind for this role. 
Almost as a post-script, the Constitutional Court noted that the docu-
mentation regime created by section 20k(7) also contributed to the provi-
sion’s shortcomings as regards the protection owed to the “core area of pri-
vate life.”315 The Constitutional Court summarily concluded that the re-
quired one-year retention of the information concerning online searches, 
after which the details about the search measures was to be deleted,316 was 
excessively short and, therefore, constitutionally inadequate.317 The Consti-
tutional Court explained that the BKA’s activities are to be documented in 
such a way as to facilitate subsequent review and control of those activi-
ties.318 Retaining that information for one year, the Constitutional Court 
concluded, did not fulfill this necessity.319 
4. Telecommunications Surveillance (section 20l) and Collection of 
Telecommunications Metadata (section 20m) 
The amended BKA-Act also authorized the BKA to conduct telecom-
munications surveillance (section 20l) and collect telecommunications 
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metadata (section 20m).320 Although these distinct forms of intrusions into 
protected privacy were governed by separate statutory provisions, the simi-
larities between them led the Constitutional Court to combine its analysis of 
the two surveillance measures.321 The Constitutional Court explained that 
the limits on the collection of telecommunications metadata are essentially 
similar to those governing telecommunications surveillance.322 Applying the 
same standards and analysis the Constitutional Court found that both provi-
sions failed to fulfill the proportionality principle in subtle ways.323 Except 
for these deficiencies that it shared with section 20l, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that section 20m was otherwise constitutional. The convergence 
of the Constitutional Court’s analysis concerning these two measures allows 
me to focus, in the following discussion, on the provisions of and the Con-
stitutional Court’s analysis respecting section 20l. 
Section 20l of the amended BKA-Act authorized the BKA to conduct 
secret telecommunications surveillance.324 The authority, however, was spe-
cifically limited to “a person” (eine Person),325 a qualification that seeming-
ly would have excluded strategic surveillance or non-targeted surveillance 
of whole telecommunications networks.326 The targets of this surveillance 
were to be similar to those against whom the amended BKA-Act permitted 
the other investigative measures I have discussed,327 including people iden-
tified by sections 17 and 18 of the Federal Police Law who pose particularly 
grave threats,328 and people about whom specific facts justify the assump-
tion that they may commit the crimes codified in section 4a(1)[2] of the 
amended BKA-Act.329 But section 20l went further, extending to two atten-
                                                                                                                           
 320 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
nalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense 
Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, §§ 20m, 20l. 
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 324 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
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Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, § 20l.  
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 326 See id. 
 327 See id. §§ 20g(1)[1]–[2], 20h(1)[1]{a}–{b}, 20k(1)[1]–[2]. 
 328 Id. § 20l(1)[1] (including “those who bring about a danger” or “those who own dangerous 
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 329 Id. § 20l(1)[2] (covering “international terrorism” and the related crimes codified in § 129a 
of the Criminal Code). 
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uated classes of targets: (1) people for whom the facts justify the assump-
tion that they will accept or transfer the telecommunications of someone 
covered by sections 17 and 18 of the Federal Police Law, and (2) people for 
whom the facts justify the assumption that they will use the telecommunica-
tions connection or device of someone covered by sections 17 and 18 of the 
Federal Police Law.330  
As is common throughout the amended BKA-Act, these measures were 
limited to those circumstances in which the law’s counter-terrorism aims 
would otherwise be hopeless or substantially more difficult.331 The law antic-
ipated that telecommunications surveillance might require technological in-
trusions into information-technology systems. In these instances, the techno-
logical and documentary provisions of section 20k were to apply.332 Techno-
logical intrusions of this kind were also to be limited to circumstances in 
which it could be certain that only running telecommunications would be rec-
orded,333 and in any case, only when such intrusions are necessary (for exam-
ple, because they help to capture telecommunications in an unencrypted 
form).334 The surveillance measures were to be ordered by a court on the ba-
sis of an application from the BKA President.335 The order authorizing the 
telecommunications surveillance was to include all relevant information and, 
as with other measures authorized by the amended BKA-Act, would limit the 
surveillance to a three-month period with one possible extension.336 The law 
also required the full cooperation of telecommunications service providers in 
the implementation of the surveillance measures, with the parameters of this 
assistance outlined in the Telecommunications Act (Telekommu-
nikationsgesetz) and the Rules of Procedure for Telecommunications Surveil-
lance (Telekommunikations-Überwachungsverordnung).337 Finally, section 
                                                                                                                           
 330 Id. § 20l(1)[3]–[4]. 
 331 Id. § 20l(1). 
 332 Id. § 20l(2) (citing id. § 20k(2)–(3)). 
 333 Id. § 20l(2)[1]. The statute refers to “laufende Telekommunications” (running telecommu-
nications acts), which encompass ongoing telecommunications exchanges and not “passive” tele-
communication acts (such as posts to blogs or wiki-sites) or telecommunications acts that have 
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 334 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
nalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense 
Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, § 20l(2)[1]–[2]. 
 335 Id. § 20l(3). The provision granted the BKA authority to order telecommunications sur-
veillance without court approval in emergency conditions. Id. 
 336 Id. § 20l(4). 
 337 Id. § 20l(5); see Telekommunikationsgesetz [TKG] [Telecommunications Act], June 22, 
2004, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 1190, last amended by Gesetz [G], May 24, 2016, 
BGBL I at 1217, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2004/TKG.pdf [https://perma.cc/U288-
UXQ6]; Telekommunikations-Überwachungsverordnung [TKÜV] [Rules of Procedure for Tele-
communications Surveillance], Nov. 3, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 3136, last 
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20l(6) imposed strict limits on telecommunications surveillance in order to 
ensure respect for the “core area of private life.”338 These limits included the 
familiar protections, such as: a formal ban on surveillance implicating the 
“core area of private life”; a presumption against surveillance if there are 
doubts about risks to the “core area of private life”; oversight by a court that 
would be responsible for reviewing and excluding from analysis and use any 
information derived from the “core area of private life”; and a duty on the 
part of the BKA to carefully document all actions relating to the protection of 
the “core area of private life.”339 Testing the provision against the protection 
provided by Basic Law Article 10, the Constitutional Court concluded that 
section 20l was only partially compatible with the Basic Law.340 
In the first step in its analysis, the Constitutional Court found that sec-
tion 20l authorized an especially serious encroachment on Basic Law Arti-
cle 10, which provides that “the privacy of correspondence, posts and tele-
communications shall be inviolable.”341 The Constitutional Court has ap-
plied Article 10 to “synchronized communication between two or more 
people by telephone,” but also to most contemporary forms of electronic 
communication, such as email and smart phone usage.342 Due to the im-
mense challenges arising from rapid technological developments and social 
change, the Constitutional Court has taken a progressive and dynamic ap-
proach to interpreting Article 10,343 not the least because it has ruled that the 
free and unhindered communication of information between individuals 
with the help of telecommunications devices is a component of human dig-
nity.344 
                                                                                                                           
amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, art. 4, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.
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 338 Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskrimi-
nalamt [BKATerrAbwG] [Act for the Federal Criminal Police Office’s Role in the Defense 
Against the Threat of International Terrorism], Dec. 25, 2008, BGBL I at 3083, § 20l(6). 
 339 Id. 
 340 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 141 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 220 (309), 2017. 
 341 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 10(1) (emphasis added); 141 BVERFGE 220 (310). 
 342 Thomas Schwabenbauer, Kommunikationsschutz durch Art. 10 GG im digitalen Zeitalter, 
137 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 1, 11 (2012) (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 343 Id. at 41. As an example of the ever-evolving field to which Article 10 must be applied, 
§ 20l(2) authorized the BKA to conduct telecommunications surveillance by way of manipulation 
of the involved technological devices or their software. This differs from more traditional methods 
of surveillance that involve only the interception of running acts of telecommunication without 
affecting their technological sources. The Constitutional Court applied Article 10 to the former, 
novel form of surveillance. See 141 BVERFGE 220 (309) (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008, 120 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVER-
FASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 274 (309), 2009). 
 344 141 BVERFGE 220 (309); Schwabenbauer, supra note 342, at 9. 
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In the second step in its analysis the Constitutional Court nevertheless 
found that the surveillance permitted by section 20l is a justified counter-
terrorism measure.345 After all, what the Basic Law gives with one hand, it 
takes away with the other. Article 10(2) permits intrusions into the right to 
telecommunications privacy “[i]f the restriction serves to protect the free 
democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or of a 
Land.”346 
Once again, in the third step of its analysis, the Constitutional Court 
found deficiencies in the limiting parameters that section 20l established for 
these surveillance measures.347 Some of the terms used by section 20l were 
not specific enough to produce the necessary delimitation of the surveil-
lance measures.348 In other ways, the shortcomings in the limiting terms 
caused section 20l to be disproportionate.349 Finally, the Constitutional 
Court found that section 20l(6) did not provide the protection necessary for 
the “core area of private life.”350 
The Constitutional Court ruled that section 20l(1)[2] lacked the requisite 
specificity and was, therefore, disproportionate.351 This provision authorized 
the BKA to undertake telecommunications surveillance against targets for 
whom facts justified the mere assumption that the target was preparing to 
engage in terrorist activities.352 This provision mirrored section 20g(1)[2] 
(authorizing special investigative measures outside the home) and suffered 
from the same constitutional shortcomings. The Constitutional Court point-
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 347 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 141 
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1938, § 15. 
 348 141 BVERFGE 220 (310). 
 349 Id. at (310, 315–16). 
 350 Id. at (315–16). 
 351 Id. at (310). 
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ed to its analysis of section 20g(1)[2],353 in which it insisted that the 
measures be applied only on the basis of specific facts pointing towards a 
concrete and imminent act, and not on a mere professional intuition.354 To 
this end, the Constitutional Court demanded that there be evidence of indi-
vidual behavior justifying the view that there is a concrete likelihood that, 
in the immediate future, a terrorist crime will be committed.355 The Consti-
tutional Court concluded that section 20l(1)[2]—just as it had with respect 
to section 20g(1)[2]—did not adequately limit telecommunications surveil-
lance to those narrow circumstances.356 
Other nuanced deficiencies in the law rendered section 20l dispropor-
tionate.357 For example, the Constitutional Court noted that there was no 
obligation to include the grounds justifying the surveillance in the Constitu-
tional Court-approved order.358 The Constitutional Court concluded that this 
shortcoming could not be remedied by giving the provision an interpretation 
that conforms to the Basic Law.359 In light of the fact that other provisions 
in the amended BKA-Act contained such an obligation,360 the Constitution-
al Court explained that it could not dismiss the possibility that the absence 
of that obligation in this instance was intentional.361 
Finally, the Constitutional Court offered a differentiated interpretation 
of the protection owed to the “core area of private life” in the context of 
telecommunications surveillance.362 On one the hand, the Constitutional 
Court insisted that telecommunications surveillance poses the risk of a par-
ticularly grave intrusion into the “core area of private life” because it inher-
ently involves the capture of the content of the communications.363 On the 
other hand, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that telecommunications 
surveillance is less threatening to the “core area of private life” than online 
                                                                                                                           
 353 Id. 
 354 Id. at (291). 
 355 Id. at (290–91). 
 356 Id. at (310). 
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Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskriminalamt 
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searches or investigative measures that intrude into the home.364 The Con-
stitutional Court explained that online searches represented a more odious 
encroachment on privacy because they have the potential to expose discrete 
bits of data that can be stored by information-technology systems for long 
periods of time, and that reflect an extremely wide-range of personal behav-
iors and interests.365 The Constitutional Court distinguished its concern for 
this kind of mosaic intrusion into privacy from telecommunications surveil-
lance, which the Constitutional Court saw as limited to a less-revealing 
technology (essentially telephones and not the Internet) and to the discrete 
telecommunications acts that can be intercepted.366 The consequence of this 
distinction is that the most strict scrutiny, which is meant to ensure the pro-
tection of the “core area of private life,” would not apply to section 20l, 
thereby leaving the legislature with some discretion to establish the required 
safeguards.  
The Constitutional Court found that, for the most part, section 20l(6) 
provided adequate protection, including: a prohibition on the collection and 
use of information implicating the “core area of private life”; independent 
assessment prior to and after surveillance to ensure respect for this prohibi-
tion; the resort to automatic surveillance and recording systems in the event 
that there is any uncertainty regarding the exposure to information from the 
“core area of private life”; the immediate deletion of any information from 
the “core area of private life” that is, despite these precautions, captured by 
surveillance; and careful documentation of the measures the BKA takes re-
garding the protection of the “core area of private life.”367 Even at the level 
of storage and use of the information acquired from telecommunications 
surveillance, the Constitutional Court was satisfied that section 20l(6) met 
the applicable standards.368 The one constitutional shortcoming that would 
have to be corrected, the Constitutional Court insisted, was the fact that the 
documentation concerning the steps the BKA had taken to protect the “core 
area of private life” could be deleted after only one year.369 As with the oth-
er uses of this rule throughout the amended BKA-Act, the Constitutional 
Court explained that this excessively short time period was constitutionally 
inadequate because it would impede the ex post judicial challenges needed 
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to hold the BKA accountable for violations of the protection owed to the 
“core area of private life.”370 
C. Constitutionality of the BKA-Act’s General Procedural Protections 
The amended BKA-Act imposed discrete safeguards on the implemen-
tation of the various, newly-introduced investigative powers. The preceding 
section outlined many of these safeguards and the Constitutional Court’s 
assessment of them. In most cases, the Constitutional Court found that these 
discrete precautions and limits satisfied constitutional demands for specific-
ity, clarity and proportionality. Still, a number of the provisions—especially 
those related to the “core area of private life”—were found to be unconstitu-
tional. But this tailored regime for the protection of privacy was not the 
complete extent of the BKA-Act’s safeguards. The complainants also chal-
lenged the quality, or utter absence of, general privacy protections that were 
to be implemented with each exercise of any of the BKA’s new investiga-
tive powers. Four of these procedures attracted the Constitutional Court’s 
attention, including: the BKA-Act’s lack of a specific statutory prohibition 
on comprehensive or total surveillance actions;371 the privacy protection the 
BKA-Act extended to privileged professional relationships (section 20u);372 
the BKA-Act’s provisions relating to transparency (section 20w), judicial 
review (section 20v), and oversight;373 and the BKA-Act’s provisions relat-
ing to the deletion of the collected data and related records.374 Here, too, the 
law was largely found to be constitutionally acceptable. But the Constitu-
tional Court nonetheless identified a handful of violations and ordered that 
they be corrected by the deadline in the summer of 2018. In the following 
sections, I present the Constitutional Court’s analysis with respect to each of 
these four concerns. 
1. Statutory Prohibition on Comprehensive Surveillance 
(Rundumüberwachung) 
The complainants argued that the amended BKA-Act suffered from the 
unconstitutional omission of a specific statutory provision prohibiting com-
prehensive surveillance.375 Such a prohibition would protect against the mas-
sive encroachment on privacy that would result from the cumulative applica-
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tion of the new investigative powers over a long period of time, leading to the 
“nearly gapless registration of a target’s movements and life-expressions,” 
and permitting the state to develop a comprehensive personality profile of its 
target.376 In its 2004 Acoustical Surveillance Case, the Constitutional Court 
found that these conditions would amount to a violation of human dignity and 
were, therefore, constitutionally prohibited.377 But, as it had done in previous 
cases, the Constitutional Court refused to characterize the omission of an ex-
plicit prohibition of total surveillance as a violation of the Basic Law.378 The 
Constitutional Court concluded that constitutional proportionality review—
especially as it requires the Constitutional Court to weigh the intrusion’s aims 
against the severity of the harm it does to privacy—would be an adequate 
bulwark against this risk.379 The Constitutional Court was also reassured that 
the manageable size of and limiting structures within the BKA justified the 
legislature’s confidence in leaving the matter of the prohibition on compre-
hensive surveillance to general investigative regulations.380 
2. The Protection Owed to Privileged Professional Relations (section 20u) 
Section 20u of the amended BKA-Act provided general protections 
against the collection and use of information that is drawn from interactions 
with privileged professionals.381 Relying on elements of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure that identify those who can refuse to testify in a criminal proceed-
ing, section 20u recognized two classes of professionals that were owed two 
distinct kinds of protection. On the one hand, section 20u(1) prohibited any 
investigative measures that would develop information from members of the 
clergy, criminal defense counsel, or parliamentarians.382 On the other hand, 
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section 20u(2) only provided proportionality protection against surveillance 
involving other privileged professionals, such as attorneys and pregnancy or 
drug counselors.383 
Except for one detail, the Constitutional Court found no constitutional 
violation with this arrangement.384 The Constitutional Court objected to the 
distinction the statute drew between criminal defense counsel (given a strict 
prohibition on surveillance by section 20u(1)) and attorneys advising clients 
in other matters (whom section 20u(2) only protects with the application of 
proportionality review).385 The Constitutional Court explained that this dis-
tinction could not be justified in light of the fact that the newly-authorized 
powers were designed to permit investigations into general threats and not 
just the narrower field of criminal investigations.386 
The Constitutional Court was not troubled by other constitutional chal-
lenges the complainants raised against section 20u.387 The Constitutional 
Court concluded, for example, that the exclusion of other professions from 
the protections provided by section 20u, such as journalists or media repre-
sentatives, did not violate the Basic Law’s guarantees of freedom of the 
press, professional freedom, or equality.388 The Constitutional Court insisted 
that these constitutional rights permitted the legislature to tailor the intensity 
of privacy protection to specific circumstances and that the legislature has 
considerable discretion in making these decisions.389 In any case, other pro-
fessional relationships would be protected by the application of the propor-
tionality analysis. And, in cases such as those involving psychological 
treatment, the privacy of other professional relationships would be secured 
by the heightened protection owed to the “core area of private life.”390 
3. Transparency (section 20w), Judicial Review, and Oversight 
The complainants challenged a range of provisions in the amended 
BKA-Act, arguing that they failed to fulfill the constitutional mandate for 
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transparency, judicial review, and oversight.391 In previous decisions, the 
Constitutional Court had found that these concerns were rooted in the pro-
portionality principle and enjoyed constitutional status.392 The Constitution-
al Court found that the BKA-Act largely satisfied these requirements.393 
Still, it identified two general privacy protections that were constitutionally 
inadequate.394 
The BKA’s duty to report on the implementation of its new investiga-
tive powers, as outlined in section 20w of the amended BKA-Act,395 sur-
vived the Constitutional Court’s scrutiny.396 In varying constellations, de-
pending on the nature of the investigative measures and the depth of their 
intrusion on privacy, section 20w required the BKA to report on its surveil-
lance activities to the targets and to others who would be affected by the 
measures.397 Unsurprisingly, this duty would be triggered only when report-
ing would not undermine the investigation.398 More controversially, howev-
er, the provision allowed the BKA to suspend the duty to report if exposing 
its operations would pose a risk to “the survival of the state, to a person’s 
life, limbs, or freedom, or to property having meaningful value and the 
preservation of which is in the public interest.”399 A suspension of the duty 
to report was not to last longer than one year, a period of time that could be 
extended only with a court order.400 The duty to report could expire alto-
gether, however, if it were suspended for more than five years.401 
The Constitutional Court was satisfied that the reporting regime estab-
lished by section 20w could be given a constitutional interpretation.402 The 
Constitutional Court insisted that, when applying section 20w, the ordinary 
courts must not accept a mere abstract possibility of the impairment of an 
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investigation as grounds for suspending the duty to report.403 The Constitu-
tional Court also found the expiration of the duty to report after five years to 
be acceptable, explaining that it was satisfied with the BKA’s representation 
during the proceedings in the case that it was the agency’s practice to delete 
(and therefore not make further use of) the results of its investigations prior 
to the five-year deadline.404 
The Constitutional Court also found that the BKA was subject to consti-
tutionally adequate means allowing targets to request and obtain information 
about the agency’s investigations and to use that information in judicial pro-
cesses to secure a remedy for abuses.405 The Constitutional Court explained 
that section 19 of the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) 
empowers a data subject to request and obtain “information on 1. stored data 
concerning him, including any reference in them to their origin, 2. the recipi-
ents or categories of recipients to whom the data are transmitted, and 3. the 
purpose of the storage.”406 The Constitutional Court reasoned that this right is 
fully applicable to the BKA (including the information generated by the im-
plementation of the new investigative powers) because it is not among the 
provisions of the Federal Data Protection Act that were explicitly excluded 
with respect to the operations of the BKA.407 The Constitutional Court insist-
ed on the constitutional adequacy of the Federal Data Protection Act’s disclo-
sure requirement despite the fact that the law’s liberal national security excep-
tion would allow the agency to refuse disclosure in most cases involving the 
exercise of its new investigative powers.408 Citing a similar explanation of-
fered in the Counter-terrorism Database Case,409 the Constitutional Court 
accepted that such exceptions are unavoidable for the BKA’s effective realiza-
tion of its mandate and are, therefore, constitutionally tolerable.410 The Con-
stitutional Court was also satisfied that the jurisdiction of the administrative 
law courts and private law courts provided the constitutionally required fora 
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for challenging the BKA’s operations and, when appropriate, obtaining reme-
dies for abuses of its investigative powers.411 
In other ways, however, the amended BKA-Act did not provide the 
constitutionally required transparency and oversight.412 The Constitutional 
Court reasoned that effective oversight has even greater importance in this 
context because of the practical barriers (such as the secrecy of the opera-
tions) that stand in the way of a robust application of individual control 
through judicial review.413 With this in mind, the Constitutional Court iden-
tified two shortcomings in the amended BKA-Act.414 
First, the law did not provide for the necessary supervision by an inde-
pendent authority.415 The Constitutional Court explained that an effective 
system of supervision has two central elements: the existence of an inde-
pendent entity with effective competences; and the careful documentation 
of all agency actions associated with personally-revealing information, in-
cluding collection, storage, analysis, use, transfer, reporting, and deletion.416 
The Constitutional Court insisted, “Technical and organizational measures 
must ensure that the data is available to the Federal Data Protection Com-
missioner in such a way that it can be evaluated in a practicable manner.”417  
The Constitutional Court concluded that the amended BKA-Act was 
deficient in both of these respects. Although the Federal Data Protection 
Office would have the necessary authority to review the BKA’s opera-
tions,418 the Constitutional Court found that the amended BKA-Act did not 
require routine oversight by the data protection authorities on at least a bien-
nial schedule.419 The Constitutional Court also found that the amended BKA-
Act lacked a comprehensive regime for documenting the agency’s handling 
of personally-revealing information.420 It is true that some of the discrete pro-
visions establishing the BKA’s new investigative powers contained their own 
terms for documenting the implementation of the measures.421 But the Con-
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stitutional Court found that even these provisions were incomplete and un-
clear and, for this reason, departed from the general standards for record-
keeping as they relate to data-protection issues.422 One example of these 
deficiencies was the lack of an obligation in section 20w to document the 
decision to suspend the duty to report on surveillance to those affected by 
the measures.423 The Constitutional Court explained that the highly-detailed 
level of documentation demanded by the Basic Law in this context was par-
tially justified by the fact that the new investigative measures could be de-
ployed as part of operations to monitor and protect against threats, and not 
only as part of a concrete criminal law investigation that would be accom-
panied by the thorough safeguards of ordinary criminal procedure.424 
Second, the new law did not require the BKA to make regular reports 
to parliament and the public.425 The Constitutional Court explained that a 
general duty to report on its operations is necessary to enable public discus-
sion and to promote democratic control.426 
4. General Requirements Regarding Deletion of Information (section 
20v(6)) 
Finally, among the general procedures for the protection of privacy that 
the Constitutional Court considered, the deletion provisions of section 20v(6) 
of the amended BKA-Act also were found essentially to be constitutional.427 
Still, the Constitutional Court identified two subtle problems here.428 
Section 20v(6) required that any personally-revealing data collected by 
the BKA through the implementation of its new investigative powers be 
deleted as soon as storage of the data is no longer necessary to promote the 
aims that it was originally collected for, or for use in a judicial review of the 
agency’s operations.429 The law required that the deletion of data was to be 
documented and that this protocol, in turn, was to be deleted one year after 
the deletion.430 In the event that the information was retained to facilitate 
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judicial review, then the data-subject’s permission was not required for any 
access to the data that could be used only for the specific purpose of judicial 
review proceedings.431 The Constitutional Court found this regime, as a 
general matter, to be constitutionally acceptable.432 Nevertheless, the Con-
stitutional Court held that the provisions fell short of the constitutional 
standard in two ways. First, the Constitutional Court ruled that the 
timeframe for deleting the deletion protocol was too short.433 The one-year 
deletion schedule for the deletion protocol, the Constitutional Court ex-
plained, might produce documentary gaps in the biennial external audits the 
Constitutional Court demanded in its assessment of the amended BKA-
Act’s oversight regime.434 Second, the Constitutional Court objected to the 
sentence of section 20v(6) that waived the deletion requirement “to the de-
gree that the data are necessary for the prosecution of crimes.”435 This pro-
vision was unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court explained, because the 
amended BKA-Act did not generally anticipate the use of the information 
collected pursuant to the new investigative powers for the support of crimi-
nal prosecutions.436 Instead, the new measures were meant to support the 
BKA’s efforts to monitor and prevent serious threats.437 
D. Constitutionality of the BKA-Act’s Provisions for New  
Use of Investigative Information 
The final constellation of BKA activities that the Constitutional Court 
scrutinized as part of its painstaking assessment of the amended BKA-Act 
involved the adequacy of the limits on the use to which the agency could 
put the information it had acquired from the implementation of its new in-
vestigative powers. The Constitutional Court approached this constitutional 
concern from three angles. First, it considered the terms the law established 
for the BKA’s use of information it had obtained, including the agency’s use 
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of information beyond the specific circumstances that originally justified its 
collection.438 Second, it considered the terms governing the BKA’s transfer 
of information it had obtained to other German law enforcement and securi-
ty authorities.439 Third, it considered the terms under which the statute per-
mitted the BKA to transfer information to foreign, non-E.U. public authori-
ties.440 Relying particularly on its decision in the Counter-terrorism Data-
base Case, the Constitutional Court asserted two general principles as fun-
damental guides to its analysis.441 On the one hand, the Constitutional Court 
recognized a substantial difference between two scenarios: a new use of the 
information that is nonetheless in pursuit of the same objectives that justi-
fied the original investigative operation; and use of the information oriented 
to altogether new objectives.442 The latter circumstances, the Constitutional 
Court explained, required much stricter limitations than the former.443 On 
the other hand, the Constitutional Court insisted that the use and transfer of 
information gathered from encroachments upon especially private interests 
(such as the inviolability of the home or the confidentiality and integrity of 
information-technology systems) should be subject to the strictest limita-
tions.444 Responding to criticism from the dissenting justices that character-
ized the majority’s analysis as activist, the Constitutional Court called its 
new articulation of this framework a “consolidation of a long line of juris-
prudence developed by both of Senates of the Federal Constitutional Court” 
that “does not constitute an intensification of the standards.”445 Neverthe-
less, the Constitutional Court outlined extensive changes to the BKA-Act 
that would be necessary to ensure its conformity with the Basic Law. 
Before turning to a description of the Constitutional Court’s holding 
and reasoning with respect to the three distinct questions it addressed in this 
part of its decision, I offer a fuller explanation of the general principles it 
applied. This is justified by the strong practical interest Germany’s security 
partners likely have in a clear understanding of the limits the Constitutional 
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Court imposed on transfers of the fruits of the BKA’s expansive new inves-
tigative powers to foreign, non-E.U. authorities. 
1. General Framework for the Use and Transfer of Information 
The Constitutional Court explained that the legislature may authorize 
additional use of information gathered by the BKA, beyond the use that 
originally justified its collection.446 But the additional use of the infor-
mation requires an independent legal justification.447 The Constitutional 
Court identified two distinct classes of “additional use” of information, each 
having a distinct standard for the required independent legal justification.448 
The first class involves a new use of the information but for the same objec-
tives.449 In these circumstances, the Constitutional Court explained, the con-
stitution requires “adequate links” (Zweckbindung) between the subsequent 
use and the original legal justification for the collection of the infor-
mation.450 The second class involves a use of information for altogether 
new purposes, for which the Basic Law requires that the new use satisfy the 
criteria the Constitutional Court referred to as a “hypothetical re-collection 
of data” (hypothetische Datenerhebung).451 The second of these classes is 
more dubious and its accompanying standard for an independent legal justi-
fication is stricter. The criteria of a “hypothetical re-collection of data” will 
be satisfied only if the data could be collected, as if in the first instance, us-
ing the same intrusive measures for the wholly new objectives.452 That is, 
the new use of the information is to be treated as a new (hypothetical) 
search in its own right. The point of this standard is clear: subsequent use of 
information is not to serve as a backdoor around constitutional safeguards, 
thereby permitting the analysis and use of information for purposes that 
would not justify its collection. 
The Constitutional Court, in its doctrinal framing of this regime, out-
lined the two classes of “additional use” in some depth. First, with respect 
to a new use of information for the same objectives, the Constitutional 
Court explained that the “adequate links” requirement is meant to be more 
permissive.453 There must be some Spielraum (“scope”) for the thorough 
use of information the BKA has collected within constitutional parame-
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ters.454 The Constitutional Court even accepted the possibility that the in-
formation might be used after its initial collection as the “starting point” of 
a new investigation.455 If the new use is adequately linked to the original 
justification for the surveillance measures, then the information can serve as 
the requisite evidentiary basis for another concrete operation.456 But the 
Constitutional Court insisted that this liberal standard does not permit un-
bounded new use of information.457 In particular the Constitutional Court 
warned the BKA against gaming the standard from the outset by asserting 
abstract or broadly defined objectives (as justifications for the initial sur-
veillance) that would then leave ample space for a wide range of subsequent 
uses.458 Instead, the “adequate links” with the original objectives, the Con-
stitutional Court explained, consist of a new use by the same agency that is 
exercising the same responsibility in pursuit of the same legal interests.459 
Finally, the Constitutional Court noted that the “adequate links” standard 
must be tightened if the information that is to be put to a new use was 
drawn from highly-intrusive surveillance of the home or online searches of 
information-technology systems.460 In these sensitive circumstances, the 
additional use also must be essential to the BKA’s response to an imminent, 
discrete threat or danger.461 
Second, the Constitutional Court allowed that the legislature could 
permit a new use of information for new objectives, but it insisted that the 
intensity of the encroachment used to collect the information must be 
aligned with the new objectives.462 The data collection standard requires 
that this kind of additional use, for wholly new purposes, be treated as an 
altogether new intrusion into constitutionally protected basic rights.463 The 
new use, in these circumstances, must be proportional, weighing the intensi-
ty of the original investigative measure against the new objectives.464 Ap-
                                                                                                                           
 454 Id. at (325). 
 455 Id. at (325–26). The Constitutional Court noted, for example, that security officials could 
not hope to develop an appreciation for secretive terrorist infrastructures and operations if they 
were obliged to work exclusively from disembodied, disaggregated, and discrete bits of infor-
mation. The BKA, the Constitutional Court explained, must be able to reconstruct these links and 
webs within the legal boundaries of its mandate. The Constitutional Court insisted, however, that 
those outer legal limits mean that the BKA does not have a blank check. See id. 
 456 Id. 
 457 Id. at (324). 
 458 Id. 
 459 Id. at (324, 326) (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 460 Id. at (326) (Russell A. Miller trans.). 
 461 Id. 
 462 Id. at (326–27). 
 463 Id. (citing Weber & Saravia v. Germany (No. 54934/00), 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173). 
 464 Id. at (327). 
1610 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1545 
plying the traditional understanding of proportionality to this scenario 
means that information originally collected pursuant to intensive intrusions 
into privacy can only be used later if the new purposes to which it will be 
applied also are very important. The new use of the information, the Consti-
tutional Court explained, must serve a legal good or interest in investigation 
of criminal actions that would justify the constitutional collection of the 
information with equally-aggressive measures.465 The Constitutional Court 
acknowledged that the “hypothetical re-collection of data” standard nar-
rowed the previous, less demanding approach.466 But, it pointed to the 
emergence of the new standard across its more recent cases, including the 
Data Stockpiling Case and the Counter-terrorism Database Case.467 
Armed with these general principles, the Constitutional Court assessed 
several provisions of the BKA-Act that authorized “additional uses” of pre-
viously acquired information. 
2. The BKA’s Additional Use of Information (section 20v(4)) 
Section 20v of the amended BKA-Act established a number of proce-
dural protections to limit the effects of the BKA’s new investigative pow-
ers.468 At subparagraph 4, for example, the provision formally identified and 
limited the ways that the BKA could use the information it collected.469 This 
provision raised questions about the BKA’s authority to make “additional 
use” of information beyond the purposes that originally justified the surveil-
lance. Section 20v(4) authorized the BKA to use the information in order to 
realize the agency’s responsibilities concerning threats to national security, 
as defined by section 4a(1)[1] of the amended BKA-Act.470 This is the gen-
eral statutory authority under which the BKA would make “additional use” 
of the information it collects pursuant to its new investigative powers. 
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The Constitutional Court ruled that, for the most part, this provision was 
constitutional.471 The Constitutional Court found that the statute effectively 
limited the information’s use to a narrow and concrete range of purposes 
(such as combatting the threat posed by international terrorism) so that any 
“additional use” was clearly aimed at the same objectives.472 This meant that 
section 20v(4) represented the first category of “additional use” (a new de-
ployment of the information for the same objectives) and was only subject to 
the less-strict “adequate links” standard. The provision was adequately specif-
ic so that the Constitutional Court was not worried about an application of the 
information to wholly new purposes. This was the case, said the Constitution-
al Court, despite the provision’s awkward features.473 Nor was the provision’s 
general character (orienting the new investigative powers to the broadly con-
strued “threats from international terrorism”) imprecise.474 The Constitutional 
Court was satisfied that the statute properly limited additional use of collected 
information to the protection of legal interests that were just as significant as 
those that had originally justified the surveillance.475 The Constitutional Court 
only objected to the fact that section 20v(4) did not adequately limit the ways 
that the BKA might use information collected from the surveillance of homes 
or from online searches of information-technology.476 
3. The Transfer of Information to Other German Authorities (section 
20v(5)) 
The Constitutional Court gave some facets of section 20v(5) of the 
amended BKA-Act more exacting scrutiny because they involved the more 
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dubious category of “additional use,” that is, a new use of information for 
altogether new objectives.477 The Constitutional Court concluded that the 
transfer of information to other agencies would open a “double door” for 
the flow of information that creates the opportunity for the new use of the 
information for new purposes.478 The Constitutional Court ruled that a 
number of these elements of the provision were unconstitutional because 
they did not satisfy the “hypothetical re-collection of data” standard.479 
Section 20v(5) authorized the BKA to transfer information to law en-
forcement and other authorities in Germany.480 The transfer would have to 
be necessary, however, to facilitate one of three objectives: (1) to promote 
the BKA’s duty of mutual cooperation with other security agencies, as de-
fined by section 4a(2)[3] of the BKA-Act; (2) to protect against grave 
threats to public security or to prevent a terrorist crime, as defined by sec-
tion 129a of the Criminal Code, except that transfers of information collect-
ed pursuant to BKA-Act sections 20h, 20k, and 20l would be permitted only 
for actions to defend against urgent threats to public security that involve 
the community or a danger to life; and (3) to contribute to the prosecution 
of crimes in cases where a subpoena ordering the collection of the infor-
mation would be warranted, except that transfers of information collected 
pursuant to BKA-Act sections 20h, 20k, and 20l would be permitted only 
for the prosecution of serious crimes.481 
The Constitutional Court found no constitutional violation with respect 
to the first of these options (section 20v(5)[1]). In this context the Constitu-
tional Court resorted to the more permissive “adequate links” standard be-
cause it concluded that “the transfer of data for the purpose of mutual un-
derstanding and coordination does not itself implicate a change in pur-
pose.”482 The Constitutional Court was satisfied that the provision could be 
narrowly interpreted to ensure that the transfers were limited to helping fa-
cilitate the internal operations arising from the BKA’s inter-agency coopera-
tion and would not involve new substantive uses of the information by the 
receiving agencies.483 For this reason, the Constitutional Court explained, 
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the information’s new use (via transfer) was still strictly and formally asso-
ciated with the objectives that originally justified the BKA’s original collec-
tion of the data.484 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the second of the transfer options, 
section 20v(5)[1]{2}, was constitutionally flawed.485 The Constitutional 
Court focused on the provision’s distinct clauses. The first authorized trans-
fers of information to help combat grave dangers to public security.486 Alt-
hough this might create the possibility of new uses of the information for 
new purposes, the Constitutional Court was satisfied that the law met the 
stricter “hypothetical re-collection of data” standard and was, therefore, 
constitutional.487 This was the case, the Constitutional Court explained, 
even as this part of the law authorized transfers of information collected 
pursuant to the BKA’s most intrusive new investigative powers (surveil-
lance in homes, online searches of information-technology systems, and 
telecommunications surveillance).488 The Constitutional Court found, how-
ever, that the provision’s second clause was unconstitutional because it did 
not meet the “hypothetical re-collection of data” standard.489 This element of 
the law authorized transfers to help defend against criminal acts and the Con-
stitutional Court ruled that it was disproportionately broad.490 The Constitu-
tional Court explained that the underlying criminal law provisions did not 
demand the same degree of suspicion (especially as to concreteness) as would 
be necessary for the use of the BKA’s most intrusive new investigative pow-
ers.491 Transferring information for use in these less-weighty circumstances, 
the Constitutional Court reasoned, involved the kind of “changed objec-
tives” that merited the stricter standard and more rigorous limitations.492 
Finally, the Constitutional Court ruled that the last of the transfer op-
tions, section 20v(5)[1]{3}, was unconstitutional.493 The Constitutional 
Court explained that transfers of information collected pursuant to the 
BKA’s invasive new powers for the purpose of supporting criminal prosecu-
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tions constituted a new use for altogether new purposes.494 But, the provi-
sion did not meet the stricter “hypothetical re-collection of data” stand-
ard.495 The Constitutional Court found that the law would permit transfers 
of this information (even when it was the product of intrusive measures) for 
use in the prosecution of a broad range of crimes, including many minor 
crimes.496 But, if the transfer were treated (hypothetically) as a first-instance 
application of the BKA’s new powers, then the Constitutional Court conclud-
ed that the measures would not be permissible, especially for the minor 
crimes potentially covered by the law.497 The Constitutional Court reached 
the same conclusion when considered the portion of this provision that sought 
to limit the transfer of information gathered with the BKA’s most intrusive 
measures—home surveillance, online searches of information-technology 
systems, and telecommunications surveillance—for use in the prosecution of 
only serious crimes, which the law defined as crimes carrying a possible pris-
on term of five years or more.498 Following the logic of the “hypothetical re-
collection of data” standard, the Constitutional Court concluded that this class 
of crimes would not have been serious enough to justify the application of the 
most intrusive of the new powers in the first instance.499 Thus, these crimes 
could not justify a transfer at a later time.500 Finally, the Constitutional Court 
found that the portions of the provision that authorized the transfer of infor-
mation to Germany’s domestic intelligence services also failed to fulfill the 
“hypothetical re-collection of data” standard because the law did not limit 
the use of the information by the receiving agencies only to the fulfillment 
of their responsibility to protect the public.501 
4. The Transfer of Information to Non-E.U. Public Authorities (section 14) 
The Constitutional Court wrapped-up its analysis of the BKA-Act’s 
provisions that provide for “additional use” of the agency’s surveillance 
information with an assessment of section 14, which authorized the BKA to 
share personally-revealing information with “foreign, non-E.U. police and 
justice officials, as well as foreign, non-E.U. public agencies responsible for 
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protecting against or prosecuting criminal activities.”502 The Constitutional 
Court focused only on transfers to foreign, non-E.U. authorities because the 
complainants did not challenge the separate provision of the amended BKA-
Act governing transfers to agencies or institutions in E.U. member states.503 
Section 14, permitting the BKA to transfer information to foreign, non-E.U. 
intelligence authorities, was never going to be the most popular measure in a 
broad statutory scheme that stirred antipathy among many Germans. But, by 
the time the Constitutional Court published its decision in May 2016, the pro-
spect of German intelligence cooperation with foreign services had become 
the scandalous backdrop to the BKA-Act Case. Edward Snowden’s leaks,504 
which laid bare America’s voracious intelligence-gathering operations in 
Germany and Europe, prompted rigorous scrutiny of Germany’s intelligence 
services.505 A parliamentary inquiry committee exposed the breadth and trou-
bling character of the German intelligence services’ cooperation with (some 
might prefer the term “subservience to”) America’s intelligence agencies, in-
cluding the NSA.506 This story became a major headache for Chancellor 
Merkel’s government. Although the Constitutional Court never mentions it, 
the messy NSA-Affair, if only as a matter of political atmosphere, clearly in-
formed the Constitutional Court’s review of section 14. 
Section 14 of the BKA-Act limited foreign, non-E.U. transfers of sur-
veillance data to circumstances where doing so would be necessary to pro-
mote one of two aims.507 First, foreign transfers were envisioned if they 
were necessary to fulfill the BKA’s responsibilities, to facilitate internation-
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al criminal law proceedings, or, in discrete cases, to promote public security 
in the face of a serious threat.508 As I explain below, the Constitutional 
Court applied the stricter “hypothetical re-collection of data” standard to 
this range of “additional use” of the BKA’s surveillance information and 
found that the last of these possibilities was unconstitutional.509 Second, the 
law permitted foreign, non-E.U. transfers if they were necessary for a re-
sponse to evidence that a serious crime was going to be committed.510 As I 
explain below, the Constitutional Court again applied the stricter “hypothet-
ical re-collection of data” standard and found this provision unconstitution-
al. In both circumstances, the Constitutional Court further tightened the al-
ready strict “hypothetical re-collection of data” standard out of respect for 
additional concerns linked specifically to the transfer of the BKA’s investi-
gative data to foreign states. Finally, the Constitutional Court condemned 
section 14 for lacking adequate procedural safeguards, including obligations 
to report on foreign transfers, to document foreign transfers, and to submit 
foreign transfers to oversight. 
To begin its analysis, the Constitutional Court addressed the complexi-
ty of applying the Basic Law to the transfer of surveillance information for 
use by foreign, non-E.U. authorities, which is not governed by the Basic 
Law and, therefore, not subject to its protection of basic rights.511 The Con-
stitutional Court explained, however, that this gap in rights coverage does 
not fundamentally preclude transfer of information to foreign, non-E.U. 
states.512 The Constitutional Court found that this transfer may be part of the 
Basic Law’s command that Germany participate in systems of international 
cooperation,513 even when the receiving state’s legal system does not con-
form to the high-level of rights protection secured by the Basic Law.514 The 
difficulty lies, the Constitutional Court explained, in fulfilling the require-
ment that German public authority remain bound by the Basic Law’s essen-
tial rights, despite the fact that the receiving state’s public authority is only 
bound by its legal regime.515  
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In this situation, the Constitutional Court insisted that the legislature 
ensure the enjoyment of constitutional protections, to the degree possible, 
on both sides of the transfer.516 The Constitutional Court ruled that the law 
authorizing foreign, non-E.U. transfers of information must have two fea-
tures. On the one hand, it should carefully limit transfers due to concerns 
for privacy and, on the other hand, it should limit the use of that information 
by the receiving state even if a transfer is allowed.517 In both respects—
transfer, and the receiving state’s use of information—the Constitutional 
Court emphasized that the law must be guided by the interest in promoting 
human rights.518 Transfer to and use of information by foreign, non-E.U. 
states must be excluded if the receiving state has a questionable human 
rights record or if there are concerns that the receiving state might violate 
fundamental elements of the rule of law.519 Above all, the Constitutional 
Court insisted, German state authority cannot lend a hand to human rights 
violations.520 The Constitutional Court explained that the legislature can 
navigate the potentially competing demands of international cooperation 
and respect for basic rights by enacting the following principles in clear and 
specific terms: (1) limit the transfer of personally-revealing information to 
circumstances involving adequately weighty objectives that would satisfy 
the stricter “hypothetical re-collection of data” standard; and (2) require 
assurances that the receiving state’s use of transferred information—
formally and practically—will respect the rule of law.521 
The first of these demands is merely an application—to the context of 
foreign, non-E.U. transfers—of the framework developed for circumstances 
in which collected information would be used for altogether new objectives. 
Here, as in the case of domestic transfers of information, the “hypothetical 
re-collection of data” standard requires that the transfer is justified by secu-
rity concerns that are as weighty as those that justified the original surveil-
lance measures.522 The Constitutional Court insisted that, at a minimum, the 
suspicion of a security threat or criminal activity that serves as the basis for 
the transfer must be concrete enough to justify measures for the defense 
against mid-level crimes or mid-level threats to legal interests.523 Finally, 
the Constitutional Court again demanded that a stricter standard must apply 
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to transfer of information gathered from surveillance of the home or from 
online searches of information-technology.524 
The Constitutional Court had to develop more fully the second of its 
demands, which was unique to the context of foreign, non-E.U. transfers. 
The Constitutional Court explained that the requisite assurance that a for-
eign legal system will respect the rule of law does not mean that the foreign 
legal system must be identical to Germany’s.525 The Constitutional Court 
instead insisted that “[a] transfer of data to third countries requires that the 
data will be handled in the third country in sufficient conformity with rule-
of-law standards.”526 The receiving state cannot subvert the human rights 
protection owed to personally-revealing information.527 To the contrary, its 
legal regime must guarantee a measured, material data-protection standard 
that is applicable in the receiving state and that accounts for the following 
essential privacy safeguards: linking the use of surveillance information to 
the objectives for which it is gathered, a duty to eventually delete the infor-
mation, and fundamental arrangements for oversight and data-security.528 
The Constitutional Court emphasized that the receiving state’s legal regime, 
in order to meet this standard, must make particular guarantees that the 
transferred information is not used for political persecution and does not 
contribute to inhumane or degrading treatment.529 A receiving state’s satis-
faction of this standard, the Constitutional Court explained, should be de-
termined by reference to the local law and the receiving state’s international 
law commitments, both in formal and practical terms.530 But this determina-
tion need not be made on a case-by-case basis. The law could permit the 
BKA to make a general assessment of conditions in specific states, with 
such a general assessment continuing in force as long as it is not called into 
question by developments in specific circumstances.531 In reaching a con-
clusion about the integrity of a receiving state’s legal system, however, the 
Constitutional Court insisted that the BKA’s assessment is not merely a po-
litical question.532 Instead, it must be a substantive legal decision based on 
regularly updated information.533 Finally, the Constitutional Court required 
that the BKA thoroughly document its decision about a foreign, non-E.U. 
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state’s fitness to receive transferred information so that it can be subject to 
review by data-protection and judicial authorities.534 
In articulating this standard, the Constitutional Court drew inspiration 
from recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the 
“CJEU”) and the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”), thereby 
joining its privacy jurisprudence to a thickening data-protection regime op-
erating across various jurisdictions in Europe’s complex system of multi-
level governance.535 In Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, for ex-
ample, the CJEU held that the European Commission’s finding that Ameri-
can law provided an “adequate level of protection” to personally-revealing 
information did not live up to the demands of Article 8 of the E.U.’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.536 American law was supposed to provide a “safe 
harbor” for the protected transfer to the United States of personally-
revealing information that originated in Europe.537 The CJEU, as the Con-
stitutional Court did in the BKA-Act Case, acknowledged that the receiving 
state cannot be required to guarantee a level of protection that is identical to 
the E.U.’s legal order.538 Instead, effectively resorting to a tautology, the 
CJEU explained that an “adequate level of protection” is achieved if the 
“third country in fact [ensures], by reason of its domestic law or its interna-
tional commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and free-
doms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European 
Union.”539 The CJEU was skeptical of the self-certification approach at the 
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center of the American regime.540 But, the CJEU was decidedly disturbed 
by the casual manner in which national security concerns could be invoked 
to derogate from whatever protections the American law afforded.541  
In any case, the protections provided by American law were too weak. 
The CJEU concluded that the Commission’s Decision did not identify in the 
American regime the minimum required data-protection safeguards.542 The 
shortcomings included: (1) the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s exclusive 
focus on commercial data-protection issues to the neglect of intrusions by 
public authorities; (2) the absence of rules limiting the use of information to 
purposes that originally justified its transfer to the United States: (3) the 
concern that U.S. intrusions on privacy can take the form of general surveil-
lance and access without differentiation, limitation, or narrow exceptions; 
(4) the U.S. authorities’ access on a generalized basis to surveillance con-
tent; and (5) the absence of adequate judicial review for remedies and the 
eventual erasure of the transferred information.543 For these reasons the 
CJEU ruled that the Commission’s Decision was invalid with the result that 
the U.S. “safe harbor” was suddenly closed to billions of dollars’ worth of 
data transfers from the E.U. 
The Constitutional Court also cited the decision Zakharov v. Russia as 
support for the requirement that the BKA be assured that a foreign, non-
E.U. state would not use transferred information in ways that undermine 
human rights and the rule of law.544 A Grand Chamber of the ECtHR issued 
Zakharov in December 2015, ruling unanimously that a Russian telecom-
munications surveillance regime was incompatible with Article 8 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights.545 The ECtHR found that Article 8 
imposed two demands.546 First, in the context of secret surveillance, the 
ECtHR acknowledged that the usual requirements of accessibility and fore-
seeability cannot be strictly enforced without contradicting the internal log-
ic of secret surveillance.547 It would be enough, the ECtHR explained, if an 
E.U. Member State’s surveillance law gives adequate notice regarding 
when, and with what justifications, surveillance is permitted.548 Second, the 
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ECtHR identified a sweeping catalogue of minimum safeguards necessary 
in a democratic society that limit the effects of these encroachments on Ar-
ticle 8.549 These safeguards include: (1) specific and grave crimes or threats 
as a basis for surveillance; (2) discrete classes of people who can be subject 
to surveillance; (3) limits on the duration of surveillance measures; (4) es-
tablished rules governing the storage, analysis and use of personally-
revealing information; (5) precautions to be followed with transferring in-
formation; (6) the circumstances either allowing or requiring the deletion of 
information; (7) a role for independent and impartial judges in authorizing 
surveillance measures; and (8) ex post notice to subjects of surveillance in 
order to facilitate review and provide remedies for abuses.550 
The Constitutional Court applied its nuanced regime—with its obvious 
debts to the jurisprudence of the CJEU and ECtHR—to the BKA-Act and 
concluded that the law’s provisions for the transfer of information to for-
eign, non-E.U. authorities was unconstitutional.551 First, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that section 14(1)[1]{1} and {3} did not meet the stricter “hy-
pothetical re-collection of data” standard.552 These sub-paragraphs author-
ized foreign transfers for the most general of purposes: the fulfillment of the 
BKA’s responsibilities or, in discrete cases, to promote public security in the 
face of a serious threat.553 But these vague purposes, the Constitutional 
Court worried, might involve aims that fall short of those that originally 
justified the surveillance measures.554 The Constitutional Court also found 
that sub-paragraph 3 (authorizing foreign transfers to promote public securi-
ty in the face of a serious threat) did not limit the transfer of information 
taken from home surveillance or online searches of information-technology 
systems.555 The Constitutional Court insisted that information gathered pur-
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suant to these extreme intrusions could be transferred only in response to 
the most imminent and grave threats.556 Second, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that section 14(1)[2] did not meet the “hypothetical re-collection of 
data” standard.557 This sub-paragraph authorized the foreign transfer of in-
formation in response to evidence that a serious crime was going to be 
committed.558 The Constitutional Court found that the law failed to account 
for the distinctly intrusive character of some of the BKA’s new investigative 
powers, which could be justified only by the most grave threats or 
crimes.559 Once again, the Constitutional Court had telecommunications 
surveillance, home surveillance, and online searches of information-
technology systems in mind.560 The Constitutional Court also ruled, with 
respect to both of the challenged provisions (section 14(1)[1] and [2]), that 
the law did not limit the transfer of information to circumstances where evi-
dence established an adequately concrete suspicion of a security threat or 
crime.561 Finally, the Constitutional Court found that section 14(1) was un-
constitutional because it did not provide adequate oversight and reporting 
requirements, including the duty to document thoroughly the transfer of 
information.562 
CONCLUSION: A PANTOMIME OF PRIVACY 
The BKA-Act Case was welcomed by many as a clarion privacy mani-
festo for our digital age.563 This view builds on a common perception of 
Germany’s “exceptional” privacy jurisprudence. But the BKA-Act Case 
specifically, and the Constitutional Court’s approach to privacy more gener-
ally, prompt at least two critiques. The first is that the Constitutional Court’s 
detailed, painstaking approach to the BKA-Act Case and other judgments in 
this area of the law involved the justices too deeply in delicate national se-
curity policy matters. The judgment’s two dissenting justices objected to the 
majority’s judicial activism at the expense of more democratically-
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accountable institutions. The second is the more fundamental criticism that 
the Constitutional Court has pursued a mere pantomime of privacy that does 
not live up to the hopes of today’s privacy advocates. Instead the Constitu-
tional Court articulated a privacy jurisprudence writ small, where precise 
deletion deadlines and careful documentation of surveillance count for more 
than “the right to be let alone.”564 
The positive responses to the BKA-Act Case suggest that the Constitu-
tional Court, from its bucolic seat in Karlsruhe, has accurately divined the 
country’s mood concerning privacy and security, especially in the wake of 
the NSA-Affair. Green Party Parliamentarian Renate Kunast made the link 
between the Constitutional Court’s decision and the NSA-Affair explicit, 
praising the Constitutional Court for drawing a sharp contrast with what she 
believes to be the lawless regime under which the American Intelligence 
Community operates. “The Constitutional Court has in mind a model other 
than the NSA,” Kunast exulted.565 “It attends to the protection of the core of 
basic rights and has even demanded independent oversight.”566 The German 
Pirate Party’s Representative for Data-Protection called the decision “Karls-
rhue’s answer to the NSA.”567 What an answer. 
The BKA-Act, in one sweeping gesture, granted to the BKA all the 
various investigative and surveillance powers Germany’s other law en-
forcement and intelligence services had been accumulating—sometimes in 
piecemeal reforms—over decades. It also regulated some altogether new 
territory in the field, especially regarding the transfer of information within 
Germany and to foreign, non-E.U. security entities. The BKA-Act, in this 
respect, was a state-of-the-art compendium of the German security commu-
nity’s investigative competences. It was security law’s Big Bang. But the 
BKA-Act was not an uninhibited “wünsch mir was” (“wish list”) for the 
BKA. The law clearly sought to give the BKA immense investigative ca-
pacity. But it also sought to frame those powers within the myriad and com-
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plex limits imposed by the basic rights as they had been interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court over the years. It was a terrible mess of a statute that 
struggled, in long and extremely detailed provisions, to find a functional 
compromise between the conflicting demands of liberty and security. 
The Constitutional Court’s painstaking assessment of the BKA-Act’s 
many provisions necessarily involved a survey of the Constitutional Court’s 
extensive jurisprudence in the area of privacy and security, including the 
interpretation the Constitutional Court had given to explicit privacy protec-
tions such as Basic Law Article 10 (telecommunications privacy) and Arti-
cle 13 (inviolability of the home). But, it also required the Constitutional 
Court to apply its jurisprudence regarding implicit privacy protections root-
ed in Basic Law Articles 1 and 2, including the absolute protection owed the 
“core area of private life,” the venerable right to informational self-
determination, and the freshly minted right to the confidentiality and integ-
rity of information-technology systems. 
The Constitutional Court found that the vast majority of the BKA-
Act’s provisions succeeded in striking the right balance between the in-
creasing demands for security and the abiding commands of the Basic Law. 
If the amended BKA-Act represented an ominous shift towards a surveil-
lance state, as many critics agonized, then the Constitutional Court’s deci-
sion from April 2016 was by no means a clear repudiation of that develop-
ment. Instead, the Constitutional Court only took exception with the details 
of some of the law’s provisions. The law was not specific enough at some 
points. The law had not always demanded the most reliable form of suspi-
cion as the basis for undertaking surveillance. Sometimes the law did not 
draw the scope of permissible surveillance narrowly enough. Many of the 
procedures established to assure that the BKA would not abuse its new 
powers did not quite hit the mark. New tests had to be articulated for the 
novel issue of foreign transfers of information. Above all, the law too often 
failed to show the required respect for the sacrosanct “core area of private 
life.” 
Still, most of the provisions of the BKA-Act survived the Constitu-
tional Court’s scrutiny. This is an indication of the restraint that was built 
into the law from the start, including special limits for measures implicating 
the inviolable “core area of private life.” The “Special Technical Investiga-
tive Measures Inside or Outside the Home” authorized by section 20h of the 
BKA-Act, for example, were permitted only in very narrow circumstances 
(not the same broad circumstances in which section 20g measures could be 
applied), were limited only to the investigative target’s home (and not other 
residence where he or she might be found), and were subject to judicial ap-
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proval.568 And, where those measures might constitute an intrusion on the 
“core area of private life,” the statute imposed additional safeguards: pro-
hibiting surveillance in the target’s home unless evidence showed that there 
was no risk of infringing the “core area of private life”; requiring immediate 
cessation of surveillance if the “core area of private life” was nevertheless 
implicated by the investigative measures; requiring the use of automatic, 
technological recording systems (as opposed to manual, human surveil-
lance); insisting that all decisions about the authorization of these meas-
ure—or the use and deletion of any information acquired from these 
measures—be taken by a court; and demanding that the entire spectrum of 
activities potentially involving information drawn from the core area of pri-
vate life be documented in a protocol that must be maintained for as long as 
necessary to facilitate oversight.  
In the face of such legislative caution, the Constitutional Court could 
only tinker on the margins. With respect to the protections provided by sec-
tion 20g for the “core area of private life,” for example, the Constitutional 
Court agonized that the law did not establish a presumption against surveil-
lance involving conversations between intimates or professionals. This less-
than-breathtaking achievement was typical of the modest Handwerk 
(“craftsmanship”) the Constitutional Court’s decision pursued. Other exam-
ples include the Constitutional Court’s insistence that, in order to ensure 
protection of the “core area of private life,” independent authorities outside 
the BKA must review information collected through online searches 
(measures taken pursuant to section 20k of the BKA-Act). The BKA-Act, 
however, allowed BKA agents to conduct this review. Perhaps the most 
humdrum of the Constitutional Court’s achievements was its demand that 
the documentary protocol, which the BKA was statutorily obliged to main-
tain regarding surveillance measures that might involve the “core area of 
private life,” be kept for longer than the one-year deletion period prescribed 
by the BKA-Act. 
Despite the fawning reception it was given, the Constitutional Court’s 
decision must surely have disappointed those most animated by concerns 
over privacy and data-protection. The Brazil-based American journalist 
Glenn Greenwald and the German novelist and privacy advocate Juli Zeh 
are representative.569 Fearing the incremental but steady erosion of privacy 
rights, and agonizing as much over the chilling effects produced by perva-
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sive surveillance and data-collection as over any tangible privacy abuses, 
these advocates could find little relief from the Constitutional Court’s 
measured and minimal response to the BKA-Act. 
In his book No Place to Hide,570 which documented and explicated 
Snowden’s disclosures from Greenwald’s firsthand perspective as one of 
former NSA contractor’s trusted media handlers, Glenn Greenwald fulmi-
nated against the chilling effects that would be triggered by any surveillance 
regime—even one constrained as the Constitutional Court insisted in the 
BKA-Act Case. Just being aware that they are being watched, Greenwald 
explained, will lead people to radically change their behavior.571 A system 
of ubiquitous surveillance aims at more than collection of information. In-
stead, Greenwald argued, its mere existence (however it might be limited) 
very potently puts people in fear and cultivates a sense of hopelessness.572 
According to Greenwald, mass surveillance, through collective coercion 
and chilling effects, has the capacity to kill dissent in the mind.573 The threat 
posed by intrusive measures taking place at all and in any form, Greenwald 
demanded, is more than just an abstract, conjectural, or unspecified threat to 
everyone’s liberty.574 From this perspective, it is hard to imagine Greenwald 
being reassured by anything less than a categorical prohibition of the very 
practices authorized by the BKA-Act and, ultimately, endorsed by the Con-
stitutional Court. 
Juli Zeh would agree. Sometimes referred to as the “Joan of Arc of the 
digital age,”575 Zeh has organized an international coalition of authors in 
protest against state surveillance and the state’s failure to offer adequate 
protection against private data-harvesting and intimate monitoring for 
commercial value.576 But, with her petitions to Chancellor Merkel, Zeh is 
not calling for the Constitutional Court’s proportional protection against the 
public and private institutions that covet our data. She is worried about a 
gradual slide into totalitarianism that is accompanied by a broad and general 
loss of freedom.577 In her open petition to Chancellor Merkel, penned in the 
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weeks following Edward Snowden’s revelations, Zeh inveighed over the 
collection and use of metadata that “captures our friendships and relation-
ships” and renders “our political orientation, a profile of our activities—yes, 
even our daily moods—transparent for the security services.”578 This, Zeh 
concluded, has made the “glass human” a reality.579 In the face of this dys-
topia, in part confirmed by the intrusive powers the BKA-Act granted the 
BKA, Zeh succumbs to the Orwellian cliché: “Big brother is watching 
you.”580 She concluded her 2009 book, Angriff auf die Freiheit (“Attack on 
Freedom”), with a visit to Orwell’s North London home.581 The pages lead-
ing up to that moment document and criticize an assault on our freedom and 
privacy that is being perpetrated by a cynical and manipulative political 
class.582 Although Zeh clearly hopes for an engaged and sustained political 
movement to resist this development, in the meantime she is counting on 
the basic rights that are enshrined in the Basic Law and enforced by the 
Constitutional Court as a last bulwark of freedom.583 Where will surveil-
lance and data-collection meet their limits? Zeh pleads for “a specific con-
stitutional protection against surveillance and data-collection.”584 But Zeh is 
not calling for the balanced, minimalist, and proportional jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court’s BKA-Act Case. She expects the Constitutional 
Court to categorically enforce a basic right to privacy, which has a “fully 
new, central meaning for the survival of democratic society.”585 
In Captain America: Civil War, BKA agents arrest the American super 
soldier, but are not able to keep him in their high-tech detention center in Ber-
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lin. The hero’s escape is aided in part by a decidedly humble antique VW 
Beetle.586 The BKA-Act Case, on the other hand, tells the story of the BKA-
Act’s auspicious escape from the most rigorous, privacy-respecting constitu-
tional limits. Its escape is abetted by a timorous Constitutional Court. 
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